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TOWARD A UNITARY COMMERCE CLAUSE: 
WHAT THE NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
REVEALS ABOUT THE COMMERCE POWER 
DONALD L. R. GOODSON* 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court’s recent Commerce Clause cases have acknowledged 
that in order to give full effect to the values of federalism embedded in the 
Constitution and the related notion that the national government is one of 
limited powers, some limitation on the commerce power is needed. But 
without an understanding of why we have the Commerce Clause in the 
first place, it is difficult to articulate a limitation of the power, much less 
one that furthers the values of federalism. Unfortunately, the Court’s own 
precedent in the affirmative Commerce Clause context does not provide 
doctrinal support for a functionalist approach given that the Court has 
instead relied on formalistic divides, such as the commercial/non-
commercial and activity/inactivity dichotomies. In contrast, the dormant 
Commerce Clause, or more accurately the negative Commerce Clause, 
provides a clear statement of the Clause’s purpose, as well as the starting 
point of a coherent limitation of the commerce power. The doctrine is able 
to provide this understanding because it has been insulated from the 
Court’s affirmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence and remains 
anchored to the Commerce Clause’s purpose. Stated succinctly, the Court 
has enforced the negative Commerce Clause to achieve the dual interests 
of interstate commercial harmony and economic union, both of which 
give doctrinal support to collective action views of federalism. At a 
minimum, the negative Commerce Clause shows that the Court should 
and can avoid formalistic categories and instead employ a functionalist 
inquiry that only permits Congress to regulate commerce among the 
several states when it furthers the ends of the Commerce Clause. 
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“Perhaps even more than by interpretation of its written word, this Court has 
advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it has given to 
these great silences of the Constitution.”—Justice Jackson1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s modern Commerce Clause decisions, beginning with 
United States v. Lopez2 and most recently National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius3, represent failed attempts to address the central conundrum 
facing modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence. On the one hand, the Court aspires 
to give meaning to the structural principles of federalism embodied in the 
Constitution. On the other hand, the Court lacks a coherent foothold to limit 
Congress’s commerce power in light of its own jurisprudence, which accorded 
virtually unlimited legislative power to Congress from 1937 to 1995.4 While clearly 
attempting to resolve this difficulty, the result reached in Lopez, using a 
commercial/non-commercial dichotomy to limit Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause, is unsatisfying. It neither advances the values of federalism nor 
places a principled limitation of the commerce power. And although Chief Justice 
Rehnquist famously opened Lopez by noting the Court would “start with first 
                                                           
 1 H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). 
 2 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 3 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 4 H. Jefferson Powell, Reflections on United States v. Lopez: Enumerated Means and 
Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L. REV. 651, 651 (1995). 
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principles,”5 he limited his discussion to structural principles of federalism 
embedded in the Constitution without tying these ideas to the purpose of the 
Commerce Clause. An analysis of first principles would have similarly addressed 
what ends the Commerce Clause serves in order to develop a principled limitation on 
the commerce power. Nor did Chief Justice Roberts make any attempt to tie his 
activity/inactivity distinction in National Federation to the underlying reason for 
having the Commerce Clause.6 Justice Ginsburg attempted to draw on the Commerce 
Clause’s purpose to support her partial dissent in that case, but she had no doctrinal 
sources to support her position—at least not in affirmative Commerce Clause case 
law.7 The premise of this Paper is that the dormant Commerce Clause, or more 
accurately, the negative Commerce Clause, provides a source of that very purpose as 
well as the starting point of a coherent limitation of the commerce power. The 
doctrine is able to provide this understanding because it has been insulated from the 
Court’s affirmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence and remains anchored to the 
Commerce Clause’s purpose. This insulation provides an analysis otherwise 
impossible under the affirmative Commerce Clause, and the Court would do well to 
look to the Clause’s negative inference in articulating a principled limitation of the 
commerce power.   
The problem, of course, is not of the current Court’s making, but rather stems in 
part from the distortions the Commerce Clause has endured since it began doing the 
work of the Reconstruction Amendments. As Professor Kenji Yoshino notes, any 
time Congress “doubted whether it could enact legislation under section 5 [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment], it turned to the commerce power, as it did when enacting 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”8 There was serious debate regarding the propriety of 
using the Commerce Clause instead of the Fourteenth Amendment at the time 
Congress decided to pursue Civil Rights under its commerce power.9 For example, 
Professor Gerald Gunther cautioned the Department of Justice that in pursuing this 
route “the substantive content of the commerce clause would have to be drained 
beyond any point yet reached,” and relying on the argument that national regulation 
was warranted “merely because some formal crossing of an interstate boundary once 
took place . . . would, I think, pervert the meaning and purpose of the commerce 
clause.”10 Rather than persuade the Court to reverse the 1883 Civil Rights Cases,11 
which held that Congress’s Section 5 enforcement powers under the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not reach private actors, Congress ultimately “decided to ground 
Title II of the Act (which prohibited discrimination in public accommodations) 
primarily on its power to regulate interstate commerce.”12 The strategy paid off and 
                                                           
 5 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. 
 6 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
 7 Id. at 2609-43. 
 8 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 770 (2011). 
 9 PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 558-560 (5th ed. 
2006). 
 10 Id. at 559 (quoting GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 203 (10th ed. 1980)). 
 11 United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 12 Yoshino, supra note 8, at 770. 
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the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Katzenbach v. McClung13 and Heart 
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States14 at the expense of the distortion that Professor 
Gunther predicted. After Katzenbach and Heart of Atlanta revealed that the Court 
would not question legislation passed under the Commerce Clause so long as one 
could rationally perceive the regulated activity as “substantially affecting” interstate 
commerce, Congress transformed the Clause into a means of achieving limitless 
federal power.15 Prior to Lopez, both the Court and observers put faith in the political 
system to serve as a restraint on the commerce power.16 However, by the time Lopez 
arrived it had become painfully clear that political restraint was not able to serve as a 
meaningful check on the Commerce Clause. 
The negative Commerce Clause, in contrast, has been insulated from the 
distortions the affirmative Commerce Clause has endured, and it is this insulation 
that provides an analysis that is otherwise impossible. To be sure, the negative 
Commerce Clause remains controversial and there are members of the Court who 
routinely object when it is applied because the doctrine lacks textual support in the 
Constitution17 or is seen to be entirely outside the judicial competence18. This Article 
will not take a position on the relative merits of the negative Commerce Clause or 
                                                           
 13 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
 14 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 15 See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 
432 (1982) (“Save for one notable exception [(Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985))], the 
Court has placed no obstacles in Congress’ path. To the contrary, the Court’s expansive 
interpretations of the power to regulate commerce among the states have prompted 
congressional enactments in such diverse areas as crime, civil rights, job safety, drug 
manufacturing, and endangered animals.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 16 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) 
(advancing a view that the role of the states in selecting the composition of the central 
government serves as a natural check on the central government’s intrusion on state power). 
But see Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense 
of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 811-26 (1995) (criticizing the view that 
because federalism values will be enforced politically based on the structure of the House and 
Senate, courts should preserve their institutional capital to protect individual rights). 
 17 See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 361 (2008) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“rather than apply a body of doctrine that ‘has no basis in the Constitution and 
has proved unworkable in practice,’ I would entirely ‘discard the Court’s negative Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence’” (quoting United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 349 (2007) (Thomas J., concurring))). 
 18 See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison 520 U.S. 564, 619 
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Any test that requires us to assess (1) whether a particular 
statute serves a ‘legitimate’ local public interest; (2) whether the effects of the statute on 
interstate commerce are merely ‘incidental’ or ‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
benefits’; (3) the ‘nature’ of the local interest; and (4) whether there are alternative means of 
furthering the local interest that have a ‘lesser impact’ on interstate commerce, and even then 
makes the question ‘one of degree,’ surely invites us, if not compels us, to function more as 
legislators than as judges.” (citing Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 
888, 897-98 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring))). 
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address critics of the doctrine’s application.19 Perhaps ironically, it is the doctrine’s 
controversial nature that makes it such a fruitful source of analysis. Indeed, one of 
the reasons why the negative Commerce Clause has escaped distortion is also a 
primary criticism: as Professor Barry Friedman notes disapprovingly, the Court has 
“mov[ed] on its own” in this arena, “with little guidance from Congress.”20 But it is 
the Court’s awareness that it is moving on its own and standing on shaky textual 
foundations that has forced it to enunciate “first principles” of the Commerce Clause 
to justify its actions under the negative inference. The controversial nature of the 
doctrine itself, then, provides the additional benefit of the Court ruminating 
extensively on what it is doing in this realm and why. Included in nearly every 
negative Commerce Clause case is an exposition of the purpose of the Clause, which 
the Court routinely ties directly to its decision to strike down or uphold a challenged 
state action. Such analysis of the Commerce Clause and the connection between 
means and ends are almost entirely absent from the affirmative Commerce Clause 
context.  
In broad terms, the Court enforces the negative Commerce Clause to achieve the 
dual interests it attributes to the Commerce Clause of interstate commercial harmony 
and economic union.21 The Court takes a strict line with respect to interstate 
commercial harmony by imposing a virtually per se rule of invalidity on 
discriminatory actions, but recognizes states retain the ability to regulate commerce 
under their police power and engages in balancing when a non-discriminatory state 
action nonetheless burdens interstate commerce and so undermines the benefits of 
economic union.22 This reveals that to further the goal of interstate commercial 
harmony, Congress should regulate to address collective action problems, such as 
                                                           
 19 For articles critical of the negative Commerce Clause, see Eule, supra note 15 
(advancing a process-based view of the interests the negative Commerce Clause serves and 
concluding that these interests are better served under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 
125 (1979) (advancing a process-based theory of the negative Commerce Clause that is 
critical of the Court’s contemporary doctrine). For articles in favor of the negative Commerce 
Clause, see Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
43 (1988) (arguing that the federalist structure of government is in need of the Court’s 
negative Commerce Clause tests, which advance the purpose of the Commerce Clause in 
interstate commercial harmony and economic union); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court 
and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
1091 (1986) [hereinafter Regan, The Supreme Court] (noting that although “balancing” is not 
needed under the negative Commerce Clause, the Court’s general condemnation of 
protectionist measures serves a valid interest in safeguarding the union). 
 20 Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 359 (1997). 
 21 This precise phraseology comes from Professor Richard Collins whose work is perhaps 
the most comprehensive treatment of the negative Commerce Clause and is in agreement with 
the central argument of this paper. See Collins, supra note 19 (noting that while the Court 
frequently uses the term free trade, historical intent and the Court’s own doctrine demonstrate 
the Court actually ascribes the dual purpose of economic union and interstate commercial 
harmony to the Clause); see also Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“The Framers intended the Commerce Clause as a way to preserve economic 
union and to suppress interstate rivalry.”). 
 22 Collins, supra note 19, at 75. 
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those caused by spillover effects23 or races to the bottom,24 that the states are 
singularly incompetent to address. To further economic union, Congress should 
address collective action problems in which a rule of uniformity is needed to avoid 
conflicting state requirements. At a minimum, the negative Commerce Clause 
teaches us that the Court can and should avoid formalistic categories such as 
direct/indirect or activity/inactivity. Just as the Court cannot strike down a state 
regulation simply because it addresses commerce, Congress should not be able to 
regulate an activity simply because it is commercial—or commercial activity—as the 
Court’s current doctrine allows. Rather, to give full effect to the ideals of federalism 
and a government of limited powers, Congress should only regulate commerce 
among the several states when it furthers the ends of the Commerce Clause.  
Before proceeding, it is worth pointing out that this relationship between the 
Commerce Clause and its negative inference did not entirely escape the Court in 
Lopez. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion flirted with drawing on the negative 
Commerce Clause for doctrinal support in that he noted the Court’s “position in 
enforcing the dormant Commerce Clause is instructive.”25 Justice Kennedy 
referenced the negative Commerce Clause to respond to “the prevailing skepticism 
that surrounds [the Court’s] ability to give meaning to the explicit text of the 
Commerce Clause.”26 Such skepticism was unwarranted, he argued, given what he 
saw as “widespread acceptance of [the Court’s] authority to enforce the dormant 
Commerce Clause, which [it has] but inferred from the constitutional structure as a 
limitation on the power of the States.”27 Justice Kennedy did not use the negative 
Commerce Clause doctrine as an anchor of the affirmative Clause’s purpose, but 
rather as a counter to the argument that the Court lacked institutional competence to 
provide a check on the power of Congress.28 Nonetheless, he is correct that the 
“dormant Commerce Clause is instructive.”29 
This Article also seeks to provide doctrinal expression for a position taken by a 
cogent line of scholarship that contends the purpose of the Commerce Clause lies in 
addressing collective action problems.30 Of note, Professors Robert Cooter and Neil 
                                                           
 23 A “spillover effect” is “when one state or group of states imposes external costs on 
other states, such as by generating pollution that crosses state lines.” Neil S. Siegel, Free 
Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and the Minimum Coverage Provision, 
75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 46 (2012). 
 24 A “race to the bottom” involves a situation in which “states generally share the same 
objective but individually have insufficient incentives to take steps to achieve it.” Id. 
 25 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579 (1995). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id.  
 28 Id. at 579-80. 
 29 Id. at 579. 
 30 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (arguing the 
commerce power “authorizes Congress to regulate problems or activities that produce 
spillover effects between states or generate collective action problems that concern more than 
one state”); Calabresi, supra note 16 (arguing the federal government should be limited to 
addressing problems posed by positive and negative externalities of individual states); Robert 
D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, 
Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 137 (2010) (arguing Article I, Section 8 provides a general 
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Siegel recently put forth a holistic theory of “collective action federalism” grounded 
largely in structural and consequentialist arguments.31 For historical support they 
point to the sixth of the Virginia Resolutions, which was the precursor to Article I, 
Section 8. The resolution articulated a general principle that gave Congress the 
power to legislate “in all cases for the general interests of the union” and in “which 
the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States 
may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.”32 Textually, Professors 
Cooter and Siegel contend that when viewed holistically rather than as individual 
clauses, Article I, Section 8 provides a comprehensive theory of Congress’s 
enumerated powers as one of “collective action federalism.”33 They correctly point 
to the negative Commerce Clause as supporting their view of collective action 
federalism, but do not use it as an independent source of analysis, as this Article 
aims to do. Professor Donald Regan similarly draws on the sixth of the Virginia 
Resolutions to advance historical and normative arguments in favor of amending the 
Lopez framework.34 He argues Congress should be able to pursue the general 
interests of the union if the states are incapable of doing so effectively.35 Despite his 
prolific writing in the negative Commerce Clause context, which advances related 
notions, Professor Regan does not reverse the analysis to provide guidance in the 
affirmative context.  
This Article will proceed in four parts. The first Part discusses the purpose of, or 
ends served by, the Commerce Clause as articulated in the Court’s negative 
Commerce Clause cases. The second Part discusses how the Court’s negative 
Commerce Clause principles or tests advance the purpose it ascribes to the 
Commerce Clause. The third Part asks whether there is a connection between what 
the states cannot do under the negative Commerce Clause and what Congress can do 
under the affirmative Commerce Clause. This Part contends there is a direct 
relationship and one that the Court can draw on as doctrinal support for a limitation 
on the commerce power in the affirmative context. The final Part discusses whether 
a new standard of review may be possible in light of the foregoing analysis.  
                                                           
theory of federalism that “assign[s] power to the smallest unit of government that internalizes 
the effects of its exercise,” meaning Congress should be limited to addressing spillover effects 
that cause collective action problems); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and 
the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555 (1994) 
(suggesting the economics of federalism indicate the federal government ought to be able to 
regulate only those areas of commerce where state regulation would be inefficient due to 
externalities); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and 
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995) [hereinafter Regan, 
Federal Commerce Power] (relying on an early draft of Article I, Section 8 to argue Congress 
should be limited to pursuing the general interests of the union if the states are incapable of 
doing so or inadequately incentivized to do so effectively, and if the rationale is state 
incompetence, Congress should be limited to playing the role of facilitator of state choices). 
 31 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 30.  
 32 Id. at 123. 
 33 Id. at 144-59. 
 34 Regan, Federal Commerce Power, supra note 30. 
 35 Id. at 610. 
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II. PURPOSE, OR THE ENDS SERVED BY THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
In order to place a limit on a given enumerated power under the Constitution, it 
would seem natural to begin with some notion of the purpose served by that power. 
Stated differently, in order to define the permissible means that are available to 
accomplish an end, it is usually necessary to know what end the means are 
attempting to accomplish. As obvious as this may seem, the Court’s affirmative 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is almost entirely devoid of such discussion. In the 
prominent contemporary affirmative Commerce Clause cases of United States v. 
Lopez,36 United States v. Morrison,37 Gonzales v. Raich,38 and National Federation 
of Independent Business v. Sebelius,39 various majority, concurring, and dissenting 
opinions vigorously debate the reach of the Commerce Clause but none of these 
opinions, with minor exception, instills its analysis with a discussion of why we have 
the Commerce Clause in the first place. The most notable exception comes from 
Justice Ginsburg’s partial dissent in National Federation, in which she notes, “[t]he 
Commerce Clause, it is widely acknowledged, ‘was the Framers’ response to the 
central problem that gave rise to the Constitution itself.’”40 The central problem was 
that the Articles of Confederation left the regulation of commerce entirely to the 
states, which, “understandably focused on their own economic interests, often failed 
to take actions critical to the success of the Nation as a whole.”41 But throughout her 
opinion, Justice Ginsburg only cites one case to support her contention, and even 
that was a short concurring opinion by Justice Stevens that had no doctrinal support 
itself.42 The other exception comes from the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy 
in Lopez, in which he notes Congress may “regulate in the commercial sphere on the 
assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable 
national economy.”43 This quote is later repeated in the Morrison majority opinion,44 
but is merely dropped in as part of a string cite and is not used as an anchor of the 
Commerce Clause’s reach. Similarly, the three critical cases from the 1930s and 
1940s that ushered in Congress’s virtually plenary commerce power—NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel,45 United States v. Darby,46 and Wickard v. Filburn47—lack 
any discussion of the ends the Commerce Clause serves. And when the Court upheld 
                                                           
 36 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 37 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 38 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 39 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 40 Id. at 2615 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. 
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244-45 n.1 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995). 
 44 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000). 
 45 Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 46 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 47 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it focused entirely on whether the regulated activity 
was commercial rather than on whether it furthered the ends of the Commerce 
Clause.48 Therefore, at the critical junctures of twentieth-century Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, majorities of the Court failed to make any reference to the purpose of 
the Clause in order to delineate the reach of Congress’s authority to regulate under 
it.49 It should come as no surprise that Congress wields its commerce power 
indiscriminately given that the Court does not require it to act in furtherance of the 
Clause’s purpose.  
In contrast to the paucity of discussion in the affirmative context, the negative 
Commerce Clause doctrine is replete with analysis of the ends served by the 
Commerce Clause. In fact, nearly every negative Commerce Clause opinion opens 
with an exposition of purpose.50 Moreover, this rumination is consistent throughout 
the twentieth century, appearing before the 1937 “switch in time,”51 during the 
                                                           
 48 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (containing no discussion of the 
Commerce Clause’s purpose); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964) (same). 
 49 Similarly, a brief review of prominent pre-1937 affirmative Commerce Clause cases 
reveals that they also failed to develop a theoretical understanding of the purpose of the 
Commerce Clause. Instead, these cases relied almost exclusively on textual arguments 
regarding the meaning of “commerce” or “among the several states” and in turn used formal 
binary distinctions, such as direct/indirect or manufacturing/commerce, to delineate the 
boundaries between permissible and impermissible congressional regulation of commerce. 
See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (containing no discussion of the purpose 
or ends served by the Commerce Clause); Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 
321 (1903) (same); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (same). Of note, 
however, is Justice Harlan’s dissent in E.C. Knight. Although he does not explicitly point to 
the purpose of the Commerce Clause, Justice Harlan implicitly recognizes the Commerce 
Clause should enable the federal government to address collective action problems that the 
states are singularly incompetent to address, such as interstate combinations in restraint of 
trade: “The common government of all the people is the only one that can adequately deal 
with a matter which directly and injuriously affects the entire commerce of the country, which 
concerns equally all the people of the Union, and which, it must be confessed, cannot be 
adequately controlled by any one state.” E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 45 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
Although Justice Harlan’s view arguably found expression in The Lottery Case, this view of 
the federal commerce power was explicitly rejected by subsequent Lochner-era majority 
opinions. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936) (“The 
proposition . . . that the power of the federal government inherently extends to purposes 
affecting the nation as a whole with which the states severally cannot deal or cannot 
adequately deal . . . ha[s] never been accepted but always definitely rejected by this court.”); 
Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273 (“There is no power vested in Congress to require the states to 
exercise their police power so as to prevent possible unfair competition.”). 
 50 See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 470 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
“[v]irtually every one of our cases in this area thus begins its analysis with some form of the 
incantation that the very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade 
among the several States” (citation omitted)). 
 51 See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) (“[A] chief occasion 
of the commerce clause was ‘the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the States, taking form 
in customs barriers and other economic retaliation.’” (citation omitted)); West v. Kan. Natural 
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911) (“If one state has it, all states have it; . . . [the welfare] of 
each state is made the greater by a division of its resources, natural and created, with every 
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period of unlimited congressional authority from 1937 to 1995,52 and even after 
Lopez.53 While the Court never explicitly acknowledges the reason for this stark 
difference, one can assume that the Court feels the need to justify its actions with 
greater specificity under the negative Commerce Clause given the doctrine’s lack of 
a textual foundation and its controversial application. Regardless of the reasons, 
when the Court invokes its power to strike down a state tax or regulation under the 
negative Commerce Clause, the Court does so on the grounds that it has “the 
responsibility . . . to determine whether action taken by state or local authorities 
unduly threatens the values the Commerce Clause was intended to serve.”54 Thus, 
the Court only acts when it furthers the purpose of the Commerce Clause.  
As Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lopez implies, the Court often states 
a narrow view of the Commerce Clause’s purpose to be the creation of “an area of 
trade free from interference by the States.”55 Whether the Court misunderstands the 
term or is simply using a pithy phrase in an undisciplined manner, “free trade” is not 
the purpose of the Commerce Clause. Instead, the Court’s own voluminous 
statements under, and actual application of, the negative Commerce Clause reveal a 
much more nuanced view of the Commerce Clause than simply free trade, defined as 
cross-border “trade left to follow its natural course.”56 More accurately, the purpose 
of the Commerce Clause is stated as a dual interest in interstate commercial harmony 
and economic union.57  
                                                           
other state, and those of every other state with it. This was the purpose, as it is the result, of 
the interstate commerce clause.”). 
 52 See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (“The few simple words of 
the Commerce Clause . . . reflected a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate 
reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the 
new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had 
plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of 
Confederation.” (citing H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-34 (1949))). 
 53 See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (noting the Commerce Clause 
“reflects a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the 
Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have 
to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the 
Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation” (citation omitted)).  
 54 Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (citing S. Pac. Co. v. 
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)). 
 55 Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977) (quoting Freeman v. 
Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)); see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980) 
(noting the negative Commerce Clause prevents “state taxes and regulatory measures 
impeding free private trade in the national marketplace”); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. 
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (referring to “the Commerce Clause’s overriding 
requirement of a national ‘common market’”); McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 
330 (1944) (stating “[t]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free 
trade among the several States”). 
 56 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 168 (2d ed. 1989). 
 57 See Collins, supra note 19. 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss3/8
2013] TOWARD A UNITARY COMMERCE CLAUSE 755 
 
A. Articulations of Purpose Under the Negative Commerce Clause 
Beginning with the Court’s own articulation of purpose, negative Commerce 
Clause dicta has often looked to the Founding Fathers for historical intent and 
developed from this a rich tradition elaborating the ends served by the Commerce 
Clause. In H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, perhaps the most frequently cited 
negative Commerce Clause case, Justice Jackson’s majority opinion begins its 
historical discussion by noting:  
[t]he sole purpose for which Virginia initiated the movement which 
ultimately produced the Constitution was to take into consideration the 
trade of the United States; to examine the relative situations and trade of 
the said States; [and] to consider how far a uniform system in their 
commercial regulations may be necessary to their common interest and 
their permanent harmony.58  
Consequently, Justice Jackson believed “[t]he [Commerce] Clause was designed 
in part to prevent trade barriers that had undermined efforts of the fledgling States to 
form a cohesive whole following their victory in the Revolution.”59 From this 
foundational observation, the Court has discerned that Congress was granted 
authority to regulate commerce among the several states in “the conviction that in 
order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward 
economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later 
among the States under the Articles of Confederation.”60 This historical analysis 
leads to the conclusion that the purpose of the Commerce Clause lies in “securing 
the maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States.”61 Statements 
of this kind, connecting the purpose of the Clause to the Court’s jurisprudence, 
appear regularly throughout twentieth-century negative Commerce Clause cases, 
including up to the present day. For example, the Court recently struck down a state 
regulation because it “risk[ed] generating the trade rivalries and animosities, the 
alliances and exclusivity, that the Constitution and, in particular, the Commerce 
Clause, were designed to avoid.”62 
Despite the clarity of this analysis, the Court often confuses itself and outside 
observers by routinely using the term “free trade” loosely when it really means 
something more complex.63 A perfect example is Commonwealth Edison Co. v. 
Montana,64 in which the Court upheld Montana’s severance tax on coal mined within 
its borders. In a bizarre twist of words, the Court begins by saying, “[t]he premise of 
                                                           
 58 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 59 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807 (1976). 
 60 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (citing H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 
U.S. at 533-34); see also Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. at 807 n.16. 
 61 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 551 (1944) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 62 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 473 (2005). 
 63 For a more detailed discussion see Collins, supra note 19.  
 64 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981). 
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our discrimination cases is that ‘the very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to 
create an area of free trade among the several States. Under such a regime the 
borders between the States are essentially irrelevant.’”65 Just a few short sentences 
later, though, the Court rejects Commonwealth Edison’s argument that “the 
Commerce Clause gives residents of one State a right of access at ‘reasonable’ prices 
to resources located in another State that is richly endowed with such resources, 
without regard to whether and on what terms residents of the resource-rich State 
have access to the resources.”66 The Court concludes by stating it is “not convinced 
that the Commerce Clause, of its own force, gives the residents of one State the right 
to control in this fashion the terms of resource development and depletion in a sister 
State.”67 This is true; the Commerce Clause does not convey such a right. But this 
last sentence is at odds with the assertion that “borders between the states are 
essentially irrelevant.”68 If that were the case, Montana could not enact this tax for its 
own citizens’ benefit on a resource located within its borders. The Court went on to 
uphold Montana’s severance tax, but not because it was consistent with a free trade 
area.69 Rather, the Court upheld the tax because it was evenhanded in that it applied 
equally to in-state and out-of-state purchasers of coal.70 In this respect, it did not 
threaten interstate commercial harmony.  
Despite the confusing wording that is often used, sorting through the Court’s 
statements regarding the purpose of the Commerce Clause is not difficult if it is 
understood that the Court is merely using shorthand for a more complicated idea. If 
the Court only believed the Clause intended commerce to be able to move freely 
across state borders without hindrance, it should not be concerned with “economic 
Balkanization,”71 interstate “rivalries,”72 “harmony and proper intercourse among the 
States,”73 affairs that the individual states “with their limited territorial jurisdictions, 
are not fully capable of governing,”74 and the idea that no state may retreat into 
“economic isolation”75 because we all “sink or swim together.”76 Yet these ideas 
appear frequently in negative Commerce Clause opinions. While addressing these 
concerns can contribute to the creation of a free trade area by making it easier for 
                                                           
 65 Id. at 618. 
 66 Id. at 619. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 618. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 610. 
 71 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (citing H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du 
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-34 (1949)). 
 72 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). 
 73 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 551 (1944). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (quoting Fulton Corp. v. 
Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996)).  
 76 Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005) (quoting 
Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523). 
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trade to move freely across state borders, they represent a broader concern for 
interstate commercial harmony and economic union. The Court is able to get away 
with using the shorthand “free trade” because, very often, the overlap between the 
principles of free trade and interstate commercial harmony are such that exact 
terminology is not needed in order to reach the proper result. Yet even the Court has 
been forced to recognize explicitly that “[t]he Commerce Clause significantly limits 
the ability of States and localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of 
interstate commerce, but it does not elevate free trade above all other values.”77 
In addition to the Court’s loose use of the phrase “free trade” when it really 
means something else, Professor Richard Collins notes that part of the confusion 
comes from the fact that merchants tend to be the ones who bring challenges to state 
actions and the Court often uses words borrowed from its individual rights 
jurisprudence, such as “discrimination” and “strict scrutiny,” in its negative 
Commerce Clause cases.78 This leads to unfortunate cross-pollination with the 
Court’s personal rights jurisprudence. Distracted by this similar terminology, 
numerous scholars argue that the Commerce Clause protects individual rights and 
should be understood using process-based theories, as articulated in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.79 and refined by Professor John Hart Ely.80 The Carolene 
Products, or process-based, theory explains the negative Commerce Clause as 
subjecting state legislation “that imposes costs on those not represented in the 
political process” to strict scrutiny.81 Not only is this theory incapable of explaining 
the entirety of negative Commerce Clause case law as shown below, but it also 
“assumes that out-of-state interests really ought to be represented—the theory 
assumes it is a defect in our system that the system denies foreigners representation, 
as it is a defect if racial minorities or women are unrepresented or represented 
ineffectively.”82 Professor Regan persuasively counters that “[n]onrepresentation of 
foreign interests follows from the simple fact that there are separate states.”83 Thus, 
the underlying assumption of the process-based theory of the negative Commerce 
Clause is directly counter to our federal system. Professor Collins warned in the mid-
1980s that the Court should be clearer in its terminology lest the argument be made 
for “retroactive judicial remedies, remedies that can be highly disruptive of state and 
local government.”84 Unfortunately, he was proved prescient when the confusion 
reached its logical conclusion in Dennis v. Higgins, in which the Court 
acknowledged the ability of individuals to bring 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights actions 
                                                           
 77 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986). 
 78 Collins, supra note 19, at 78 (“A few aberrant jurists and academics have replaced 
discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce with personal discrimination against 
nonresident merchants, a concept that if fairly applied would probably cause the Court to 
invalidate more state laws.”). 
 79 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 80 See Eule, supra note 15; LeBeouf, supra note 30; Tushnet, supra note 19. 
 81 LeBoeuf, supra note 30, at 609-10. 
 82 Regan, The Supreme Court, supra note 19, at 1164. 
 83 Id. at 1164-65. 
 84 Collins, supra note 19, at 114. 
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against states that violate the negative Commerce Clause.85 Despite Dennis, 
individual rights and process-based theories in the Commerce Clause context are 
misplaced given that the Clause has long been recognized to address commercial 
conflicts between states.86 To the extent individuals are harmed by these commercial 
conflicts, they are merely proxies for their aggrieved states.  
B. Applications of the Negative Commerce Clause Revealing the Clause’s Purpose 
Aside from pronouncements that indicate free trade is not the end served by the 
Commerce Clause, the Court’s application of the negative Commerce Clause itself 
reveals a more nuanced purpose. The application of the negative Commerce Clause 
also reveals that the doctrine does not concern individual rights because the 
principles the Court uses to govern relations among the several states would run 
directly counter to an effort to protect such rights. Without delving into detail 
regarding the actual tests the Court applies, which is reserved for Part II, a few brief 
examples from the Court’s negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence prove that 
interstate commercial harmony and economic union are more accurate descriptions 
of the Clause’s purpose than free trade. These examples are not exhaustive, but are 
merely instances in which, if free trade were the purpose of the Commerce Clause, 
the Court’s application of the Commerce Clause would contravene that very 
purpose.  
The most striking example is the principle articulated in Prudential Insurance 
Co. v. Benjamin87 that Congress is permitted, by clear statement, to allow the states 
to regulate commerce in a way that would otherwise be impermissible under the 
negative Commerce Clause.88 The Benjamin principle first appeared in the mid-
1800s in the Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.89 decision, upholding 
Congress’s ability to sanction a state action previously struck down under the 
negative Commerce Clause.90 In the earlier Wheeling Bridge case, the Court held 
that the low-lying bridge constructed over the Ohio River was an obstruction of 
interstate commerce and therefore unconstitutional under the negative Commerce 
Clause.91 Congress subsequently passed a statute specifically authorizing the 
construction of that bridge at that height.92 When the issue was relitigated and 
                                                           
 85 Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991). 
 86 Collins, supra note 19, at 46; Regan, The Supreme Court, supra note 19, at 1161-67. 
 87 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
 88 The logical consistency of the Benjamin principle is discussed in Part III, infra in 
greater detail. 
 89 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421 (1855). 
 90 See Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. 153, 155 (2005) [hereinafter Williams, Congress May Not] (noting 
“Congress has authorized states to regulate and even ban the importation of alcoholic 
beverages manufactured in other states or nations; to regulate insurance companies in ways 
that favor in-state insurers; and to limit out-of-state bank holding companies from acquiring 
in-state banks” (footnotes omitted)). 
 91 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 521 (1851). 
 92 Act of Aug. 31, 1852, ch. 112, sec. 6, 10 Stat. 110, 112 (“And be it further enacted, That 
the bridges across the Ohio River at Wheeling, in the State of Virginia, and at Bridgeport, in 
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returned to the Court, it noted the bridge was now constitutional given Congress’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce.93 Some commentators struggle with the 
apparent paradox of how something could be at once constitutional and 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.94 If free trade were the purpose of the 
Commerce Clause, it would be unconstitutional to allow Congress, even under its 
affirmative Commerce Clause authority, to sanction anti-free trade policies of the 
states. But because the negative Commerce Clause addresses interstate commercial 
harmony and economic union, the Benjamin principle is perfectly constitutional. 
This is because interstate commercial harmony is advanced when Congress, in which 
all states are represented, collectively decides to permit state regulation of commerce 
that would otherwise be impermissible. 
A second illustration comes from the Court’s recognition of state standing to sue 
another state for lost tax revenue, which also runs directly counter to a free trade 
rationale. The first, and so far only, negative Commerce Clause case in which the 
Court recognized such standing95 is Wyoming v. Oklahoma.96 In that case, Wyoming 
brought suit after Oklahoma passed a statute requiring all “coal-fired electric utilities 
in the state to burn a mixture containing at least ten percent Oklahoma-mined coal,” 
which led several utilities to reduce the amount of coal they purchased from 
Wyoming, a major coal exporter.97 To meet the standing requirement, Wyoming 
claimed its injury came in the form of lost extraction tax revenue given the reduced 
amount of coal extracted from within its borders, and the majority ultimately struck 
down the Oklahoma regulation as contravening the Commerce Clause.98 Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in that opinion provides an apt explanation of why this case, and the 
negative Commerce Clause doctrine as a whole, does not stand for free trade 
principles: “Wyoming’s right to collect taxes presents an entirely different category 
of interest, only marginally related to the national market/free trade foundation of 
                                                           
the State of Ohio, abutting on Zane’s Island, in said river, are hereby declared to be lawful 
structures in their present position and elevation, and shall be so held and taken to be, any 
thing in any law or laws of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 93 Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. at 458. 
 94 The Benjamin principle is particularly difficult for academics that believe free trade is 
the purpose of the Clause or who advocate the equally flawed individual rights and process-
oriented theories of the negative Commerce Clause. For example, because Professor Norman 
Williams contends that the “[d]ormant Commerce Clause is a constitutional limitation on state 
power that protects the ability of individuals to engage in commerce free of unduly 
burdensome or protectionist state regulation,” he is led to the conclusion that the Benjamin 
principle is unconstitutional—“Congress may not authorize the states to violate the 
Constitution.” Williams, Congress May Not, supra note 90, at 153, 156. If the negative 
Commerce Clause were anything like the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses he would 
be correct, but it is not. 
 95 There are other instances of states suing each other under the Commerce Clause, but 
where the injury asserted was simply discrimination. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 
262 U.S. 553 (1923) (striking down West Virginia statute attempting to restrict use of West 
Virginia natural gas for in-state residents). 
 96 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992). 
 97 Id. at 437. 
 98 Id. 
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our jurisprudence . . . it is in a sense positively antagonistic to that objective, since 
all state taxes . . . burden interstate commerce by reducing profit.”99 Justice Scalia is 
correct that the majority’s holding contravened free trade principles, but the majority 
was also right in striking down the Oklahoma regulation. If the Clause were about 
free trade, the Court should not have recognized any injury to bring suit given that 
lost tax revenue does not promote free trade, as Justice Scalia notes. The injury, 
though, was the threat of Oklahoma’s regulation to interstate commercial harmony. 
If Oklahoma’s regulation were to stand, nothing would stop Wyoming from 
retaliating by requiring in-state merchants to purchase ten percent of their natural gas 
from within the state and thereby reduce one of Oklahoma’s major exports.  
A final counter-example is seen in the fact that the Court routinely permits states 
to tax interstate commerce. Taxing interstate commerce is one of the greatest 
inhibitors of free trade as such commerce would undoubtedly cross borders more 
readily when left to its natural course without any such burdens. Yet the Court 
permits such taxation under two related tests. The first is the complementary or 
compensatory tax test.100 These taxes are facially discriminatory as they only apply 
to out-of-state goods that have not been subject to similar taxes applied to goods 
purchased or used within the state.101 It is not surprising that states use 
complementary taxes to level the playing field with similar goods purchased in state 
and subject to taxes applicable to such in-state purchases. Without the 
complementary tax, the in-state goods would be more expensive than comparable 
out-of-state goods. If the states could not level the playing field in this respect, it 
would likely cause tensions as they would also not be able to block importation of 
such goods under the negative Commerce Clause. By allowing compensatory taxes, 
then, the Court both advances state autonomy by allowing states to tax goods of their 
choosing and also protects interstate commercial harmony by making sure out-of-
state goods are not treated in a discriminatory manner. The second tax doctrine is the 
more complicated Complete Auto Transit four-part test in which the Court allows 
taxation of interstate commerce but does so in a way that avoids duplicative taxation 
of that commerce and “ensure[s] that each State taxes only its fair share of an 
interstate transaction.”102 If the Court were only concerned with free trade, it would 
be easier to enforce a bright-line rule that states may not tax interstate commerce, 
permitting it to cross state boundaries without hindrance. 
                                                           
 99 Id. at 470. 
 100 Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996); see also Associated Indus. of Mo. v. 
Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647-48 (1994) (“The end result under the theory of the compensatory 
tax is that, ‘[w]hen the account is made up, the stranger from afar is subject to no greater 
burdens . . . than the dweller within the gates. The one pays upon one activity or incident, and 
the other upon another, but the sum is the same when the reckoning is closed.’” (quoting 
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 584 (1937))). 
 101 See, e.g., Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 331 n.2 (noting “a tax on interstate commerce 
‘complements’ a tax on intrastate commerce to the extent that it ‘compensates’ for the burdens 
imposed on intrastate commerce by imposing a similar burden on interstate commerce”). 
 102 Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989). 
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C. Summary 
Negative Commerce Clause discussions of purpose, as well as applications of the 
doctrine, reveal that the Court has a very clear understanding of the Clause’s purpose 
as furthering a dual interest in interstate commercial harmony and economic union. 
While it is true that the Court often uses the term free trade to describe the 
Commerce Clause’s purpose, its voluminous dicta throughout negative Commerce 
Clause cases reveal a more nuanced concern. Moreover, there are several examples 
of the negative Commerce Clause being applied in ways that would directly 
contravene a free trade purpose. And although the Court recognizes the right of 
individuals to sue under the Clause, it should be acknowledged that these individuals 
are merely proxies for their aggrieved states and are not vindicating individual rights.  
III. PRINCIPLES, OR THE MEANS BY WHICH THE COURT FURTHERS THE ENDS OF THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A. Laws Discriminating Against Interstate Commerce 
In order to further the purpose of the Commerce Clause in interstate commercial 
harmony and economic union, the Court strikes down state regulations in its 
negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence under two broad categories: (1) laws 
discriminating against interstate commerce and (2) laws unreasonably burdening 
interstate commerce.103 The first directly addresses interstate commercial harmony 
and the second more closely addresses economic union. The Court frequently notes 
that addressing the commercial rivalries that riddled the states under the Articles of 
Confederation was a primary motivation for calling the Constitutional Convention, 
and the Commerce Clause is seen as addressing this problem, hence the concern for 
discriminatory measures.104 In order to prevent the sort of “economic Balkanization” 
that discriminatory policies cause, the Court applies a virtually per se rule of 
invalidity to such measures, upholding them in the rare case that the state action 
furthers a legitimate goal that cannot be accomplished by nondiscriminatory 
alternatives.105 Some commentators classify this first category as concerned solely 
with “protectionist” measures, but it is not.106 This is because protectionism is 
properly defined as “the theory or system of fostering or developing home industries 
                                                           
 103 See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338-39 (2008) (“Under the 
resulting protocol for dormant Commerce Clause analysis, we ask whether a challenged law 
discriminates against interstate commerce. A discriminatory law is ‘virtually per se invalid,’ 
and will survive only if it ‘advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately 
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.’ Absent discrimination for the forbidden 
purpose, however, the law ‘will be upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce 
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’” (citations omitted)). 
 104 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (“The 
central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws 
whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and 
retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent.” (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 
22, at 143-45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); 2 JAMES MADISON, Vices of 
the Political System of the United States, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 362-63 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901))). 
 105 See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
 106 See Regan, The Supreme Court, supra note 19. 
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by protecting them from the competition of foreign productions, the importation of 
these being checked or discouraged by the imposition of duties or otherwise.”107 It 
undoubtedly includes state regulations limiting the importation of goods from out-of-
state that will compete with in-state interests, which the negative Commerce Clause 
condemns. But the Court frequently extends this “anti-discrimination” rule to 
instances in which a state has sought to conserve a resource for use by in-state 
residents, such as water108 or natural gas,109 or when a state has sought to isolate itself 
from a problem common to all, such as landfill overflow.110 Anti-protectionist 
principles are not generally concerned with whether a nation attempts to conserve its 
own resources for its own citizens or attempts to isolate itself from a common 
problem like global warming. This is why the Court’s own use of “discrimination” is 
a more befitting definition of the rule, rather than protectionism. Such discrimination 
causes rivalries, which were the very impetus for the Constitution.111  
Discriminatory action produces, and may also be symptomatic of, spillover 
effects caused by externalities of state behavior. In economic terms, “[e]xternalities 
exist whenever the private costs or benefits of an activity do not correspond to the 
social costs or benefits.”112 Professors Cooter and Siegel “use the phrase ‘interstate 
externality’ to refer to a good or bad that is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable at the 
interstate level. Interstate externalities exist when significant benefits or costs from 
activities in one state spill over to another state without being priced.”113 
Nonrivalrous means that “one person’s enjoyment does not detract from another’s” 
and nonexcludable means it is infeasible or uneconomical to exclude others “from 
enjoying the benefits generated by the goods.”114 For example, purely protectionist 
measures shift the costs of discriminatory regulations onto external actors in order to 
capture benefits for internal actors. If the state instead applied the regulation in an 
even-handed manner, the costs would be internalized locally and would be less likely 
to produce spillover effects. The natural response of states who are the victims of 
such discriminatory regulations is to respond with like measures, thus exacerbating 
                                                           
 107 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 679 (2d ed. 1989). 
 108 See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). 
 109 See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 
221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911). 
 110 See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Or. Waste Sys., 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. 
Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 
U.S. 617 (1978). 
 111 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 390 (“The central rationale for the rule 
against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic 
protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the 
Constitution was designed to prevent.” (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 143-45 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); 2 JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the 
United States, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 362-63 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901))). 
 112 LeBoeuf, supra note 30, at 567 (citing JOHN G. HEAD, PUBLIC GOODS AND PUBLIC 
WELFARE 190 (1974)).  
 113 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 30, at 138. 
 114 Id. at 135. 
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the harm of the spillover effects. If the states could cooperate effectively, they would 
likely recognize that they are all better off in the long run working out a compromise 
solution. Transaction costs and collective action problems, though, make it very 
difficult to achieve such cooperation and states will instead pursue their own self-
interests leading to the least optimal outcome—a trade war. This extremely 
simplified discussion is treated in greater detail by far more capable scholars,115 but 
suffices for present purposes to illustrate that the non-discrimination rule is 
attempting to address the most basic collective action problem—the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma.116 By imposing a virtually per se rule of invalidity to measures that 
discriminate against interstate commerce, then, the Court responds to a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma among the states by foreclosing the option of “defection” (State acting 
alone) in order to leave “cooperation” as the only remaining option. The States can 
accomplish this cooperation by simply treating out-of-state commerce the same as 
in-state commerce or, if the activity is producing undesirable spillover effects or 
races to the bottom that require some form of collective management, the states can 
broker congressionally sanctioned compacts or Congress can achieve cooperation by 
imposing a uniform rule. 
The Court’s recent decision in Granholm v. Heald117 is a textbook illustration of 
the non-discrimination rule and is one that perfectly aligns with protectionism 
concerns as traditionally understood. Granholm addressed similar statutes in 
Michigan and New York that allowed in-state wineries to make direct sales to in-
state consumers, such as over the Internet, but prohibited or made it economically 
unfeasible for out-of-state wineries to make similar direct sales to in-state 
consumers. The existence of these statutes in a handful of states led to their 
enactment in other states and, subsequently, to the “enactment of statutes under 
which some States condition the right of out-of-state wineries to make direct wine 
sales to in-state consumers on a reciprocal right in the shipping State.”118 Justice 
Kennedy observed that: 
California, for example, passed a reciprocity law in 1986, retreating from 
the State’s previous regime that allowed unfettered direct shipments from 
out-of-state wineries. Prior to 1986, all but three States prohibited direct 
shipments of wine. . . . The obvious aim of the California statute was to 
open the interstate direct-shipping market for the State’s wineries.119  
Justice Kennedy was troubled because of the then-current state of affairs: 
States banning direct shipments altogether, others doing so only for out-
of-state wines, and still others requiring reciprocity—is essentially the 
product of an ongoing, low-level trade war. Allowing States to 
discriminate against out-of-state wine “invites a multiplication of 
                                                           
 115 See id.; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce 
Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355 (1994); LeBoeuf, 
supra note 30. 
 116 See also LeBoeuf, supra note 30, at 574-79. 
 117 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). 
 118 Id. at 473. 
 119 Id. (citation omitted). 
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preferential trade areas destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce 
Clause.”120  
Although the Court split five-four because of the unique issue posed by the 
Twenty-First Amendment, two of the dissenters acknowledged “[t]he New York and 
Michigan laws . . . would be patently invalid under well-settled dormant Commerce 
Clause principles if they regulated sales of an ordinary article of commerce rather 
than wine.”121 Thus, had this been anything other than liquor, a seven-member 
majority of the Court would have struck down these discriminatory measures 
because they threaten interstate commercial harmony.  
An example of the non-discrimination rule that does not perfectly align with 
protectionism as traditionally understood is seen in the numerous cases in which 
states have sought to conserve resources exclusively for use by in-state residents. 
Again, these are not classically protectionist because they do not involve states 
attempting to protect in-state commercial interests from out-of-state competition. 
Rather, they seek to hoard a resource in one state exclusively for use by in-state 
residents, rather than conserve such resources using even-handed measures. 
Although not classically protectionist, under our federalist structure these 
discriminatory measures produce the same threat to interstate commercial harmony. 
The early twentieth-century case of West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.122 is routinely 
cited for the harmful consequences that flow from these discriminatory measures.123 
West involved an Oklahoma statute that sought to prohibit interstate transportation of 
natural gas mined from within the state and thereby conserve the resource solely for 
use by Oklahoma residents. In a frequently quoted passage, the Court observed that  
[i]f the states have such power, a singular situation might result. 
Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining 
states their minerals. . . . To what consequence does such power tend? If 
one state has it, all states have it; embargo may be retaliated by embargo, 
and commerce will be halted at state lines. . . . In such commerce, instead 
of the states, a new power appears and a new welfare, a welfare which 
transcends that of any state. But rather let us say it is constituted of the 
welfare of all of the states, and that of each state is made the greater by a 
division of its resources, natural and created, with every other state, and 
those of every other state with it. This was the purpose, as it is the result, 
of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United 
States.124  
If conservation of a natural resource were the intent of the statute, the state could 
have legislated indiscriminately and simply capped the amount of natural gas that 
anyone could produce regardless of the purpose to which the gas would be put. In 
other words, the Court acknowledges that the states retain police power to regulate 
the health, safety, and general welfare of their own citizens, they just cannot do so in 
                                                           
 120 Id. (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951)). 
 121 Id. at 494 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 122 West v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). 
 123 See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 330 (1979). 
 124 West, 221 U.S. at 255. 
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a way that would lead to animosities with other states. As shown in Part I, if the 
concern were merely about free flow of commerce, the Court would not recognize 
the ability of states to pursue such conservation using nondiscriminatory alternatives. 
By forbidding discrimination, the Court prevents rivalries and hostility that will 
inevitably lead to retaliation while leaving room for states to pursue their own 
policies in an even-handed manner. 
This concern for non-protectionist, but otherwise discriminatory regulations is 
also seen in the several landfill cases that have reached the Court in recent decades. 
As Philadelphia v. New Jersey125 illustrates, the Court consistently strikes down state 
regulations that attempt to block the importation of waste, which can also be seen as 
an attempt to conserve landfill space for domestic use. The justification for doing so 
protects all states equally:  
Today, cities in Pennsylvania and New York find it expedient or 
necessary to send their waste into New Jersey for disposal, and New 
Jersey claims the right to close its borders to such traffic. Tomorrow, 
cities in New Jersey may find it expedient or necessary to send their waste 
into Pennsylvania or New York for disposal, and those States might then 
claim the right to close their borders. The Commerce Clause will protect 
New Jersey in the future, just as it protects her neighbors now, from 
efforts by one State to isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce 
from a problem shared by all.126  
Again, if the state merely aimed to conserve the resource, perhaps in an effort to 
effectuate a policy preference for less landfill, it could have done so by 
implementing a blanket limitation on landfill use that applied evenhandedly to in-
state residents as well as out-of-state residents. As noted above, this form of 
discrimination is perhaps more symptomatic of spillover effects. If New York and 
Pennsylvania were not perceived to be overwhelming New Jersey with garbage, the 
state would likely not have felt the pressure to pass discriminatory measures. That 
the states feel the need to pass such measures indicates Congress can and should step 
in to address this collective action problem.127  
Although the Court applies strict scrutiny to discriminatory state regulations of 
interstate commerce, there are at least three recognized exceptions that would excuse 
an otherwise impermissible state regulation. The first is the general rule that a 
discriminatory law “will survive only if it ‘advances a legitimate local purpose that 
cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.’”128 The 
                                                           
 125 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
 126 Id. at 629. 
 127 Professor Williams notes Congress has considered a bill that would authorize such 
discriminatory measures under the Benjamin principle. Williams, Congress May Not, supra 
note 90, at 156. Although the bill has failed to pass, if Congress were to pass such a bill it 
could indicate that the states collectively believe the proper solution is to encourage states that 
produce excess waste, such as New York, to find ways to internalize their waste, which might 
lead to innovative recycling improvements or otherwise reduced waste production.  
 128 Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (citations omitted). 
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reason the current doctrine uses the somewhat contradictory phrase129 “virtually per 
se invalid” to describe the Court’s approach to discriminatory measures is that Maine 
v. Taylor130 is the only instance in which such a discriminatory measure survived 
judicial challenge. Taylor upheld a ban on the importation of baitfish into the State 
of Maine on the grounds that such a ban was needed to protect native species from 
foreign parasites and non-native species.131 The Court pointed to factual evidence 
that “the small size of baitfish and the large quantities in which they are shipped 
made inspection for commingled species ‘a physical impossibility.’ Parasite 
inspection posed a separate set of difficulties because the examination procedure 
required destruction of the fish.”132 For this reason, the legitimate local purpose in 
ecological conservation could not be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives. 
The second exception applies to one of the two primary tests the Court uses to 
address state taxation of interstate commerce. This is the compensatory or 
complementary tax, which I place in the first category of cases because these laws 
facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce. As the Court notes, “a tax on 
interstate commerce ‘complements’ a tax on intrastate commerce to the extent that it 
‘compensates’ for the burdens imposed on intrastate commerce by imposing a 
similar burden on interstate commerce.”133 Such taxes are generally disfavored, 
unless they meet three conditions “distilled” from the Henneford v. Silas Mason 
Co.134 line of cases:  
First, a State must, as a threshold matter, identify the intrastate tax burden 
for which the State is attempting to compensate. Second, the tax on 
interstate commerce must be shown roughly to approximate—but not 
exceed—the amount of the tax on intrastate commerce. Finally, the events 
on which the interstate and intrastate taxes are imposed must be 
substantially equivalent; that is, they must be sufficiently similar in 
substance to serve as mutually exclusive proxies for each other.135  
This test is a way of justifying a facially discriminatory tax as achieving a 
legitimate local purpose that cannot be achieved through non-discriminatory 
means.136 As noted in Part I, these taxes address interstate commercial harmony in 
                                                           
 129 Or, as Professor Regan refers to it, “mildly oxymoronic.” Regan, The Supreme Court, 
supra note 19, at 1134. 
 130 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
 131 Id. at 131. 
 132 Id. at 141 (citation omitted). 
 133 Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 n.2 (1996). 
 134 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). 
 135 Fulton Corp., 300 U.S. at 332-33 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 136 See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 102 (1994) (“Though 
our cases sometimes discuss the concept of the compensatory tax as if it were a doctrine unto 
itself, it is merely a specific way of justifying a facially discriminatory tax as achieving a 
legitimate local purpose that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory means.” (citing 
Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 346 n.9 (1992))). 
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that they merely attempt to level the playing field between in-state and out-of-state 
commerce. If states could not offset such taxes on in-state goods, they would be 
unable to block importation of such goods under the negative Commerce Clause and 
would instead have to forego taxing similar in-state purchases or face unfair 
competition with out-of-state goods. This latter option infringes upon state autonomy 
to choose what goods to tax and at what rate, hence why the Court does not force 
states to make this choice so long as the state taxes in an even-handed manner.  
The third and final exception to discriminatory measures is the market participant 
exception, which is admittedly the hardest to explain. The key reason a state is 
unlikely to threaten interstate commercial harmony when it acts as a market 
participant is that it is spending money.137 As Professor Regan explains, “[p]artly 
because they are less coercive, and partly because it just seems obvious that when 
states distribute benefits they can prefer their own citizens, discriminatory spending 
programs seem less hostile to other states and less inconsistent with the concept of 
union than discriminatory regulation or taxation.”138 Moreover, Professor Regan 
notes that many of these spending programs benefit the nation as a whole, and if we 
did not allow States to exclude non-residents from receiving the benefits, they are 
likely to underinvest in these public goods.139 In addition, the expense of spending 
programs makes them less likely to proliferate, and because they are less hostile to 
other states, they are less likely to produce the resentment and retaliation that 
threaten interstate commercial harmony.140 However, the Court’s own inability to 
adequately explain its reasoning with respect to the market participant exception141 
and the fact that it does pose a potential threat to interstate commercial harmony 
indicate that a more consistent approach would be for the Court to apply Taylor strict 
scrutiny: A state may only act as a market participant and favor its own citizen when 
it is pursuing a legitimate objective that cannot be achieved using non-discriminatory 
alternatives.  
B. Laws Unreasonably Burdening Interstate Commerce 
With respect to the second category of cases, the Court advances the opaque 
principle that states may not “burden” interstate commerce. This is the more 
controversial application of the two, in part because the Court engages in 
“balancing” under this prong, which is seen as squarely outside the judicial 
competence. It is for this reason that Justice Scalia endorses the first half of the 
negative Commerce Clause, invalidating laws that discriminate against interstate 
commerce, but will only strike down on stare decisis grounds laws unreasonably 
burdening interstate commerce in areas the Court has previously addressed.142 
                                                           
 137 Regan, The Supreme Court, supra note 19, at 1193-94. 
 138 Id. at 1194. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 1194-95. 
 141 See Collins, supra note 19, 98-105 (analyzing the incomplete and somewhat 
contradictory justification the Court has offered for the exception).  
 142 See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would . . . abandon the ‘balancing’ approach to these 
negative Commerce Clause cases . . . and leave essentially legislative judgments to the 
Congress. Issues already decided I would leave untouched, but would adopt for the future an 
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Balancing is also controversial because it is not always clear what the Court is doing. 
Professor Regan contends that, at least in movement-of-goods cases, the Court 
should not, and actually is not, balancing but rather is employing only the anti-
protectionism principle.143 In taxation and transportation cases, though, he concedes 
the Court may be pursuing a national interest other than anti-protectionism, such as 
economic union.144 In these cases the Court may consider, to a degree, whether the 
benefits of the state’s rule outweigh the benefits of a uniform rule. Professor Collins 
contends that what the Court is doing here is simply “limit[ing] multiple and conflict 
burdens on commerce in transit and external transactions [by] allocat[ing] 
jurisdiction to the states with the strongest interest.”145 Regardless of how one 
characterizes what the Court is doing in these “balancing” cases, it seems clear that it 
is attempting to advance an interest in economic union, either by making sure that 
interstate commerce is not taxed more heavily than intrastate commerce, or by 
ensuring that state interests do not inhibit interstate commerce by imposing 
unreasonable and conflicting burdens.  
Although the second category of cases is often put under the heading of Pike 
balancing in reference to the Court’s decision in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,146 Pike 
balancing is one of two forms of balancing the Court performs in this arena. Pike 
balancing applies to regulations of interstate commerce,147 while taxation of 
interstate commerce is addressed under the Complete Auto Transit test.148 The 
principles the Court advances under both approaches do not directly address 
harmony, although it may be a happy byproduct, because there is rarely a concern 
that one state will retaliate against another in light of such regulation or taxation 
measures. Instead, the second category addresses multiple or conflict burdens that 
stymie the benefits of economic union. If economic union were all we cared about 
the Court would simply strike down every state regulation of commerce. Instead, 
“[t]he law has had to respect a cross-purpose as well, for the Framers’ distrust of 
economic Balkanization was limited by their federalism favoring a degree of local 
autonomy.”149 In this respect, there is an inherent tension in the second category of 
cases that is not as evident in the first category of discrimination cases. With few 
exceptions, it is easy to say states may not engage in discriminatory measures 
because they are rarely ever legitimate; yet, state regulations that burden interstate 
commerce often address legitimate state objectives and the Court has long 
recognized that state regulation of commerce and congressional regulation of 
                                                           
analysis more appropriate to our role and our abilities. This does no damage to the interests 
protected by the doctrine of stare decisis.”). 
 143 Regan, The Supreme Court, supra note 19. 
 144 Id. at 1182. 
 145 Collins, supra note 19, at 86. 
 146 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 147 Id. at 142. 
 148 Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989). 
 149 Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (comparing THE 
FEDERALIST Nos. 7, 11 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 42 (James Madison), with THE FEDERALIST 
No. 51 (James Madison)).  
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commerce are not mutually exclusive. When the Court “allocates jurisdiction” to the 
state with the greatest interest, to use Professor Collins’s terminology,150 it 
simultaneously furthers state autonomy by allowing reasonable regulation of 
interstate commerce, but also promotes economic union by avoiding duplicative or 
conflicting burdens on interstate commerce. Congress furthers the purpose of 
economic union in this context when it regulates in an area in need of a uniform rule 
or standard; i.e., in an area in which interstate commerce is facing conflicting 
regulations imposed by different states. Arguably, this situation also represents a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, with the Court foreclosing the option of states acting alone 
where such action produces less utility than a uniform rule or standard. Where the 
utility of such a uniform rule or standard is less than individual state regulation, the 
Court will not strike it down. The problem, of course, is that weighing interests in 
this way is an inherent policy decision and one less amenable to bright line rules 
such as no discriminating against trade coming from sister states.  
The clearest example of the Court striking down a conflicting regulation comes 
from Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona.151 In that case, an Arizona statute made it 
unlawful to operate a railroad train of more than fourteen passenger or seventy 
freight cars within the state.152 The Court pointed to  
findings show[ing] that the operation of long trains, that is trains of more 
than fourteen passenger and more than seventy freight cars, is standard 
practice over the main lines of the railroads of the United States, and that, 
if the length of trains is to be regulated at all, national uniformity in the 
regulation adopted, such as only Congress can prescribe, is practically 
indispensable to the operation of an efficient and economical national 
railway system.153  
In its defense, Arizona advanced a local interest in safety, arguing that shorter 
train car lengths lead to fewer accidents.154 The Court was skeptical of any safety 
benefit and held that even if it were shown that shorter car lengths are safer, the 
increased safety accruing to residents of Arizona was not enough to offset the 
incredible cost caused by conflicting train length requirements. 155 Because 
neighboring states had different requirements than Arizona, trains had to stop well 
before they reached the border and re-arrange their train cars to meet the 
requirements, which was deemed too great a burden.156 In contrast, the Court has 
upheld different and conflicting requirements for train operating crews, even though 
they impose a burden on interstate commerce.157 In doing so, the Court 
                                                           
 150 Collins, supra note 19, at 86. 
 151 S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 771. 
 154 See id. at 782. 
 155 Id. at 779. 
 156 Id. at 775-76. 
 157 See Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 
393 U.S. 129 (1968) (upholding state law regulating composition of train crew). 
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acknowledged a legitimate safety rationale and noted that the requirement, while 
imposing a financial burden on the railroads, was not an unreasonable burden on 
interstate commerce.158  
With respect to taxation, the Court applies the Complete Auto Transit test to state 
taxation of interstate commerce. Stated succinctly, the Court will uphold state 
taxation of interstate commerce “when the tax is applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the 
State.”159 The Court later elaborated in Goldberg v. Sweet that “the central purpose 
behind the apportionment requirement is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair 
share of an interstate transaction,” and to “determine whether a tax is fairly 
apportioned [the Court] examin[es] whether it is internally and externally 
consistent.”160 The internal and external consistency tests are just another way of 
stating the Complete Auto Transit requirements, but they reveal more clearly the 
reasoning behind this allocation. “To be internally consistent, a tax must be 
structured so that if every State were to impose an identical tax, no multiple taxation 
would result.”161 To be externally consistent, the state can only tax “that portion of 
the revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the in-state 
component of the activity being taxed.”162 In other words, the test ensures that states 
are able to collect reasonable taxes on interstate commerce that makes use of benefits 
provided by the state; i.e., interstate commerce is made to “pay its way.”163 But the 
test does so in a way that does not overly burden interstate commerce and put it at a 
disadvantage to purely intrastate commerce. In this respect, the Court simultaneously 
furthers state autonomy while also advancing economic union. 
C. Extraterritorial Regulation  
In yet an additional arena of “burden” cases, which is sometimes classified as 
protectionism, the Court prevents states from regulating outside their territorial 
boundaries. For example, in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State 
Liquor Authority,164 the Court struck down New York’s “affirmation law,” which 
required distillers to affirm that they would not sell liquor in any other state at a 
lower price than the price at which they had sold to New York wholesalers in the 
prior month. The Court unconvincingly attempted to analyze the law under negative 
Commerce Clause tests by contorting it into protectionism: “Economic 
protectionism is not limited to attempts to convey advantages on local merchants; it 
may include attempts to give local consumers an advantage over consumers in other 
States.”165 But requiring New York consumers to receive the same price as 
                                                           
 158 Id. at 139-40. 
 159 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
 160 Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1989). 
 161 Id. at 261. 
 162 Id. at 262. 
 163 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 102 (1994) (quoting 
Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 281). 
 164 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986). 
 165 Id. at 580 (citing New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982)). 
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consumers in other states does not accord them an advantage, so it is not clear how 
this is protectionist. The Court then went on to revive, in a way, the long-abandoned 
distinction between direct versus indirect regulations of commerce by noting that 
“[f]orcing a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a 
transaction in another directly regulates interstate commerce.”166 This is perplexing 
as the Court routinely permits “direct” regulation of interstate commerce in nearly 
every negative Commerce Clause case in which the court upholds the contested state 
regulation, so long as it is not discriminatory and does not place an undue burden on 
interstate commerce. I contend that these few cases, although they seem to raise 
negative Commerce Clause concerns, do not actually run afoul of the Commerce 
Clause itself. Rather, what the Court means by “direct” is that a state is legislating on 
a nationwide scale, which only Congress can do. Professor Regan also observes that 
the Court’s attempt to squeeze these cases into the negative Commerce Clause does 
not make sense because “the extraterritoriality principle is not to be localized in any 
single clause” but is instead derived from structural principles in the Constitution as 
a whole.167 Therefore, these few cases168 will not be discussed at length in this paper 
as they have very little to do with the negative Commerce Clause despite the fact that 
the Court is addressing forbidden extraterritorial legislation under this doctrine.169  
D. Summary 
The above analysis of negative Commerce Clause tests and rules is admittedly 
superficial and does not do justice to the complexity of the doctrine. Nor does it 
address the various outliers or controversial hard cases in which the Court may have 
produced dubious results. Instead, this discussion aims to outline the broad contours 
of the Court’s negative Commerce Clause rules to show how they advance the 
purpose of the Commerce Clause in interstate commercial harmony and economic 
union. To the extent that the Court has reached more questionable results, a more 
disciplined adherence to the Clause’s dual interest in interstate commercial harmony 
and economic union would help clarify the negative Commerce Clause as well, such 
as requiring the market participant exception to adhere to Taylor strict scrutiny 
analysis. Few disagree with the first broad category of cases addressing 
discriminatory state regulations, which clearly advance interstate commercial 
harmony. The second category of cases involving burden balancing is inevitably 
more controversial because of the inherent tension the Court is trying to address 
                                                           
 166 Id. at 582. 
 167 Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1865, 1887 (1987). 
 168 See also Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (invalidating state statute 
requiring out-of-state shippers of beer to affirm their posted prices for products sold to 
Connecticut wholesalers are no higher than the prices at which those products are sold in 
bordering states); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding 
Indiana statute determining the voting rights of shares of Indiana corporations); Edgar v. 
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (invalidating Illinois statute regulating the terms of 
interstate tender offers). 
 169 Professor Collins analyzes these cases under his allocational principle, but given that no 
state can legislate beyond its borders, the Court itself cannot allocate the right to do so. See 
Collins, supra note 19, at 94-98. 
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between state autonomy and economic union, which bright line rules cannot easily 
resolve. Nonetheless, the Court is clearly trying to further the purpose of the 
Commerce Clause in economic union under this branch of the doctrine. Moreover, 
unlike the “substantially affects” test under the affirmative Commerce Clause, these 
two broad categories of principles are directly tied to an understanding of the 
Commerce Clause’s purpose.  
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WHAT THE STATES CANNOT DO AND WHAT 
CONGRESS CAN DO 
By this point in the paper, readers may conclude that it is all well and good that 
the Court furthers economic union and interstate commercial harmony under the 
negative Commerce Clause, but there is no direct relationship between what the 
states cannot do and what Congress can do. Indeed, it appears to be an accepted fact 
in the scholarly literature that the two doctrines are and should be completely 
divorced from one another.170 Congress, after all, is given an affirmative grant of 
power in the Constitution that says nothing about what the states cannot do. This 
would be true if our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence were itself based on a 
separate textual foundation in the Constitution, but it is not. Rather, the negative 
inference itself implies that there is and should be a relationship between the two 
doctrines. Admittedly, under existing jurisprudence, it is not clear how the Court’s 
pronouncements in the negative Commerce clause context relate to its affirmative 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. I argue that the general principles of the negative 
Commerce Clause reveal a great deal about the limitations that should be placed on 
the affirmative commerce power. Specifically, the negative Commerce Clause 
instructs us that a key problem with modern affirmative Commerce Clause doctrine 
is that it has become overly formalistic and obsessed with a single word, 
“commerce,” at the expense of a more functionalist understanding driven by the 
purpose of the Commerce Clause.  
A. The Cooley Principle  
One point on which both critics and opponents of the negative Commerce Clause 
can agree is that the affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce 
among the several states did not completely divest the states from also regulating 
commerce, even commerce that is interstate. This point is central to the negative 
Commerce Clause, but it also reveals a critical flaw in the Court’s affirmative 
Commerce Clause doctrine. To elaborate, Chief Justice Marshall first suggested 
there was “great force” to the idea that Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 excluded state 
regulation of interstate commerce in Gibbons v. Ogden,171 but it was not until Cooley 
                                                           
 170 See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2000) (arguing the Court’s affirmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
during the Gilded Age was the flip side of the Court’s negative Commerce Clause but was 
decoupled in the 1930s); Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual 
Federalism, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1847 (2007) [hereinafter Williams, Dual Federalism] (arguing 
the two doctrines are, and should be, completely divorced from one another because of 
divergent theoretical concerns underlying them). 
 171 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 209 (1824); see also Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1398 (2004) (“Cooley refined a pre-existing understanding of the 
Commerce Clause that Chief Justice John Marshall first articulated over twenty-five years 
earlier in the seminal case Gibbons v. Ogden.”). 
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v. Board of Wardens172 that the Court directly addressed “whether the grant of the 
commercial power to Congress, did per se deprive the states of all power to regulate 
[commerce].”173 Cooley answered in the negative, and since then the case has stood 
for the proposition that the realms of what Congress can regulate and what the states 
can regulate are not mutually exclusive.174 This proposition lies at the heart of the 
negative Commerce Clause, since it explains why the Court does not strike down all 
state regulations of interstate commerce. While Cooley is routinely cited merely for 
the limited idea that states remain free to regulate Commerce in the absence of 
congressional legislation, the Court’s approach to this question also illuminates the 
limitation on Congress’s affirmative power to regulate commerce. To illustrate this 
point it is necessary to quote the Court at length: 
If [the States] are excluded it must be because the nature of the power, 
thus granted to Congress, requires that a similar authority should not exist 
in the states. . . . But when the nature of a power like this is spoken of, 
when it is said that the nature of the power requires that it should be 
exercised exclusively by Congress, it must be intended to refer to the 
subjects of that power, and to say they are of such a nature as to require 
exclusive legislation by Congress. Now the power to regulate commerce, 
embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various 
subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a 
single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United 
States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as 
imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local 
necessities of navigation.  
 
Either absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of this power requires 
exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of the nature of the 
subjects of this power, and to assert concerning all of them, what is really 
applicable but to a part. Whatever subjects of this power are in their 
nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of 
regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require 
exclusive legislation by Congress.175  
The import of these words is clear—the nature of the power granted to Congress 
to regulate commerce among the several states is not co-extensive with the subjects 
of that power, i.e., commerce. Instead, states remain free to regulate commerce, even 
interstate commerce, when regulating does not conflict with the purpose of the 
Commerce Clause, which the Cooley Court narrowly defined as areas that “admit 
only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation.”176 A fundamental flaw in the 
Court’s current Commerce Clause jurisprudence is that it looks exclusively to the 
meaning of commerce to delineate the bounds of permissible congressional 
                                                           
 172 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851). 
 173 Id. at 318. 
 174 See id. at 320. 
 175 Id. at 318-19 (emphasis added). 
 176 Id. at 319. 
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legislation, a distinction the negative Commerce Clause doctrine long ago 
recognized as “los[ing] sight of the nature of the subjects of this power, and to assert 
concerning all of them, what is really applicable but to a part.”177 Herein lies a key 
problem for the Court. For if it is beyond debate that the states retain power to 
regulate commerce so long as they do not contravene the purpose of the Commerce 
Clause, then it is untenable to say, as the Court’s current doctrine does, that 
Congress may regulate any activity that is commercial in nature and thereby pre-
empt the states from so regulating. The flaw is the Court’s focus on the subjects of 
the power, rather than the nature of the power. In contrast, the negative Commerce 
Clause focuses on the nature of the power, or the purpose the Clause serves in 
furthering interstate commercial harmony and economic union.  
B. The Benjamin Principle 
A second observation addresses the relative distribution of power and, more 
specifically, whether there is a one-to-one inverse relationship between the power of 
the states and Congress. This is brought to light in one of the few areas in which the 
doctrines directly overlap, or what I refer to as the Benjamin principle. The Court is 
usually able to escape the contradictions posed by its parallel doctrines because it is 
not forced to explain the two bodies of law in the same breath when it addresses state 
regulations and congressional regulations separately. This avoidance is not possible 
in cases arising under the Benjamin principle, which requires the Court to confront 
the relationship between the Commerce Clause and its negative inference. As 
discussed in Part I, the principle dates from Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont 
Bridge Co.,178 but is now identified with Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin.179 
Benjamin stands for the proposition that Congress may, by clear statement, bless 
state action under its affirmative commerce power that would otherwise be 
impermissible under the negative Commerce Clause.180 This principle works in 
tandem with the more straightforward rule that Congress may also affirmatively ban 
what the states have blessed. The Benjamin principle often perplexes both the Court 
and observers, particularly those who advocate highly formalistic views of the 
affirmative Commerce Clause and those who advocate individual rights views of the 
negative Commerce Clause. For, “if the commerce clause ‘by its own force’ forbids 
discriminatory state taxation, or other measures, how is it that Congress by expressly 
consenting can give that action validity?”181 The Court’s answer to this question in 
Benjamin itself confuses more than it clarifies, in part because it makes the same 
mistake as in Lopez by focusing on what may be regulated rather than on why it may 
be regulated. The Court states that the limitation on Congress  
                                                           
 177 Id. 
 178 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421 (1855). 
 179 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
 180 Or, as the Court puts it, these are the cases “involving situations where the silence of 
Congress or the dormancy of its power has been taken judicially, on one view or another of its 
constitutional effects, as forbidding state action, only to have congress later disclaim the 
prohibition or undertake to nullify it.” Id. at 423-24 (footnotes omitted). 
 181 Id. at 426. 
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is entirely distinct from the implied prohibition of the commerce 
clause. . . . The one limitation bounds the power of Congress. The other 
confines only the power of the states. And the two areas are not co-
extensive. . . . [T]o blur them, and thereby equate the implied prohibition 
with the affirmative endowment is altogether fallacious. There is no such 
equivalence.182  
Furthermore, “[i]ts plenary scope enables Congress not only to promote but also 
to prohibit interstate commerce, as it has done frequently and for a great variety of 
reasons.”183 This is an additional point that confuses some, for if the Commerce 
Clause restricts the states from prohibiting or, more accurately inhibiting, interstate 
commerce, how is it that Congress can be allowed to promote or prohibit interstate 
commerce at its leisure? The problem with the Court’s answer is that it implies, as 
Prudential rightly noted in Benjamin, that Congress can sanction this otherwise 
impermissible behavior because it is “the power of Congress to make conclusive its 
own mandate concerning what is commerce.”184 This answer also casts greater doubt 
on the legitimacy of striking down state actions under the negative Commerce 
Clause. If the justification for doing so lies in the purpose of the Commerce Clause, 
surely Congress must also be constrained by the purpose of the Commerce Clause. 
Otherwise, state autonomy is squeezed from both the Court’s rulings and Congress’s 
legislation.185 In the end, the Court’s answer to the logical paradox in Benjamin is 
really no answer as it hangs its hat on the mere assertion that there is no equivalence 
between the two doctrines.  
The Court was unable to fully answer the question in Benjamin because the 
affirmative jurisprudence concerns itself only with formalistic categories and the 
negative jurisprudence concerns itself with functionalist inquiries. Without aligning 
the two doctrines under functionalist inquiries, the Court cannot adequately explain 
why Benjamin is permissible. If one thinks in functionalist terms, the Benjamin 
principle makes perfect sense and supports, rather than undermines, the Court’s 
negative Commerce Clause cases. Instead of responding that Congress may regulate 
commerce and that is the end of the matter, the Court could have been more explicit 
in explaining why it would be the case that Congress would sanction state regulation 
of insurance when it was within its power to regulate insurance itself. It may be that 
Congress believes it is preferable for the states to regulate an activity because of path 
dependency. State regulation of insurance, the activity in question in Benjamin, 
provides a possible example.186 By the time Congress began to consider the issue of 
regulating insurance the states had already built up a regulatory structure to govern 
                                                           
 182 Id. at 423. 
 183 Id. at 434. 
 184 Id. at 425. 
 185 This ratcheting effect against state autonomy may be the reason why advocates of 
states’ rights are so hostile to the negative Commerce Clause. 
 186 The relevant statute is commonly referred to as the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1011 (West 2013) (“Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and 
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that 
silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the 
regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.”). 
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the area.187 This was partly due to the Court itself because of an earlier ruling that 
had found regulation of insurance not to involve commerce.188 Arguably, it would be 
less costly to continue on that path than completely obliterate all that the states had 
built and start from scratch, even if it would be more efficient to have a uniform 
national rule.189 This is a plausible explanation of why Congress may wish to permit 
individual state regulation rather than legislate nationally, but it still does not explain 
why it is constitutionally permissible for Congress to do so. Some scholars contend 
that the rationale put forward by the Court is that coordinated action of the states and 
Congress is what makes this permissible.190 But it is not permissible to violate the 
Constitution so long as the states and Congress do it together, which is exactly why 
Professor Norman Williams believes the principle is unconstitutional.191 If this were 
the actual justification, then scholars would be right to criticize the Benjamin 
principle. This is not the justification, however.  
For a more complete and internally consistent answer, one must turn to a crucial 
component of the Benjamin principle: The requirement of a clear statement from 
Congress to bless otherwise impermissible state regulation.192 As the Court explained 
in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, requiring a clear statement 
ensures that “when Congress acts, all segments of the country are represented, and 
there is significantly less danger that one State will be in a position to exploit others. 
Furthermore, if a State is in such a position, the decision to allow it is a collective 
one.”193 In other words, a clear statement assures the Court that Congress is 
furthering the purpose of the Commerce Clause in interstate commercial harmony 
and economic union. The Court explicitly recognizes that  
                                                           
 187 See, e.g., Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Anti-Trust Law: The McCarran-Ferguson 
Act and Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81, 83 (1983) (discussing the history of the 
insurance industry in the United States and noting “[e]ach state regulated the insurance 
industry to some degree” by the time Congress first began considering federal regulation in 
the 1940s).  
 188 See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868) (holding an insurance policy is not an article of 
commerce), overruled by United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 
(1944); see also Williams, Dual Federalism, supra note 170, at 1867 (“the Court held that the 
issuance of insurance contracts did not constitute commerce because there was no exchange of 
goods or commodities”).  
 189 For a discussion of the history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Anderson, supra note 
187. 
 190 See Williams, Congress May Not, supra note 90. 
 191 Id. 
 192 See Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003) (“Congress certainly has the 
power to authorize state regulations that burden or discriminate against interstate commerce, 
but we will not assume that it has done so unless such an intent is clearly expressed.” (citation 
omitted)); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986) (“[T]his Court has exempted state 
statutes from the implied limitations of the Clause only when the congressional direction to do 
so has been ‘unmistakably clear.’” (citation omitted)); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. 
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984) (“[O]ne way of meeting the requirement that for a state 
regulation to be removed from the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause, congressional 
intent must be unmistakably clear.”). 
 193 Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 92. 
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[t]he requirement that Congress affirmatively contemplate otherwise 
invalid state legislation is mandated by the policies underlying dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine. It is not . . . merely a wooden formalism. The 
Commerce Clause was designed “to avoid the tendencies toward 
economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the colonies 
and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.”194  
Whether Congress chooses to legislate a uniform rule or allow the states to 
regulate individually is a policy decision that it is free to make, but it is nonetheless a 
collective decision. The requirement of a clear statement squares the circle and 
explains fully the paradox of the Benjamin principle. It is not explained by the fact, 
as the Benjamin Court argued, that the limitation on Congress “is entirely distinct 
from the implied prohibition of the commerce clause.”195 Instead, when the Court 
strikes down a state regulation that burdens or discriminates against interstate 
commerce it advances interstate commercial harmony and economic union. And 
when it allows Congress to sanction such burdens or discrimination but only by clear 
statement, ensuring a collective decision was made, it similarly furthers interstate 
commercial harmony and economic union.196 Thus, the Benjamin paradox can be 
explained by aligning functionalist inquiries rather than by relying on the formalistic 
categories of the affirmative Commerce Clause.197  
C. The Meaning of “Commerce” 
As the above analysis illustrates, the seeming paradoxes created by the negative 
Commerce Clause as well as the unlimited power of Congress can be traced in large 
part to the reliance on formalism in the affirmative context. This then leads to the 
question of whether a “unitary” Commerce Clause doctrine is possible. On this point 
it is first worth noting that the Court routinely ties itself in knots by asserting that 
“commerce” means the same thing in both contexts. The Court’s reasoning in 
Benjamin certainly implied that what it means by “commerce” in the affirmative and 
negative contexts is not the same, and the Court’s grant of unlimited authority to 
Congress often leads outside observers to conclude the affirmative context is 
                                                           
 194 Id. at 91-92 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979)). 
 195 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 423 (1946). 
 196 See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2, at 1041 (3d ed. 
2000) (“It is important to understand that . . . Congress does not transmute the constitutional 
valence of the state law at issue from negative to positive, in apparent violation of Marbury v. 
Madison. No such constitutional alchemy need be posited. Rather, the congressional 
enactment into which the state law fits should be understood to transform the state law itself—
changing not what its words say, of course, but what it means and how it operates once it has 
been transplanted from a context in which its very existence threatens to provoke retaliation 
by other states and to fragment the Union, to a context in which its threatening sting has been 
removed by the congressionally established grid into which it fits. In essence, the entry of 
Congress onto the legal landscape serves to tame, in a sense to domesticate, a state law that, 
before Congress entered the picture, represented a paradigmatic instance of what the 
Commerce Clause was designed to prevent.”). 
 197 This is also further proof that the negative Commerce Clause does not concern 
individual rights, which the Court is applying through process-based theories. If it were, the 
Benjamin principle would be blatantly unconstitutional. 
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considerably more expansive.198 Yet, the Court went out of its way in City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey199 to correct this apparent misconception. Philadelphia 
concerned a case on appeal from the New Jersey Supreme Court, which interpreted 
the Court’s negative and affirmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence as providing 
two definitions of commerce: “When relied on ‘to support some exertion of federal 
control or regulation,’ the Commerce Clause permits a very sweeping concept of 
commerce. But when relied on ‘to strike down or restrict state legislation,’ that 
Clause and the term ‘commerce’ have a ‘much more confined reach.’”200 The Court 
rejected this “two-tiered definition of commerce” as a misreading of prior case 
law.201 Rather, “[j]ust as Congress has power to regulate the interstate movement of 
these wastes, States are not free from constitutional scrutiny when they restrict that 
movement.”202 Thus, the Court advanced the belief that the terms are trans-
substantive between the two doctrines, indicating it is not comfortable with the view 
that the two doctrines are completely divorced from one another. The only way to 
bring them into alignment is by relying on functionalism in both contexts. The 
contrary option, relying on formalism, will abolish state autonomy and confer 
unlimited power on Congress or return us to the unstable binaries of the late 
nineteenth century. 
On at least one occasion, a majority of the Court has provided a glimpse of what 
a unified functionalist approach to the Commerce Clause could look like. In 
Sporhase v. Nebraska,203 the Court confronted a Nebraska statute that required any 
person who withdrew ground water from any well in the state with intent to transport 
it for use in adjoining states to first obtain a permit from the Nebraska Department of 
Water Resources. The permit issued only if the Department found such withdrawal 
was reasonable, not contrary to conservation of ground water or otherwise 
detrimental to public welfare, and, critically, only if the state in which the water was 
to be used also granted reciprocal rights to withdraw water and transport it for use in 
Nebraska.204 The majority struck down the statute on the grounds that the reciprocity 
requirement imposed an unconstitutional discrimination against interstate 
commerce.205 The case is noteworthy for its unique approach to the analysis. A quirk 
in prior case law cast doubt on whether water was in fact an article of commerce, 
requiring the Court to address an issue that is normally taken for granted.206 In this 
                                                           
 198 Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408. 
 199 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
 200 Id. at 621 (citations omitted). 
 201 Id. at 622. 
 202 Id. at 622-23. This rejection of a two-tiered definition of commerce was reiterated post-
Lopez. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 574 (1997) 
(“The definition of ‘commerce’ is the same when relied on to strike down or restrict state 
legislation as when relied on to support some exertion of federal control or regulation.” 
(quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979))). 
 203 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). 
 204 Id. at 944. 
 205 Id. at 960. 
 206 Id. at 953. 
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respect, the case provides a rare instance in which the Court had to decide 
simultaneously and de novo whether Congress could legislate under its affirmative 
power and whether the states were forbidden from regulating under the Clause’s 
negative inference.207 The Court first addressed the obstacle of precedent, which had 
relied heavily on differences in property law among the states, some of which 
allowed an owner of land to freely sell “all of the percolating water he could capture 
from the wells on his land,” whereas in others, like Nebraska, “the surface owner has 
no comparable interest in ground water.”208 The Court ultimately found that “[i]t 
would be anomalous if federal power to regulate economic transactions in natural 
resources depended on the characterization of” the ownership interest that can vary 
state-to-state.209  
Second, and more interesting for present purposes, was the Court’s assertion of 
why water was an article of commerce and thus susceptible of Congressional 
regulation. Nebraska’s claim was that it was beyond the reach of the Commerce 
Clause because “water, unlike other natural resources, is essential for human 
survival”210 and therefore exclusively within its police powers. The Court conceded 
that Nebraska and  
the amici curiae that are vitally interested in conserving and preserving 
scarce water resources in the arid Western States have convincingly 
demonstrated the desirability of state and local management of ground 
water. But the States’ interests clearly have an interstate dimension. 
Although water is indeed essential for human survival, studies indicate 
that over 80% of our water supplies is used for agricultural purposes. The 
agricultural markets supplied by irrigated farms are worldwide. They 
provide the archtypical [sic] example of commerce among the several 
States for which the Framers of our Constitution intended to authorize 
federal regulation. The multistate character of the Ogallala aquifer—
underlying appellants’ tracts of land in Colorado and Nebraska, as well as 
parts of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas—confirms the view 
that there is a significant federal interest in conservation as well as in fair 
allocation of this diminishing resource.  
The Western States’ interests, and their asserted superior competence, in 
conserving and preserving scarce water resources are not irrelevant in the 
Commerce Clause inquiry. . . . [T]hese factors inform the determination 
whether the burdens on commerce imposed by state ground water 
regulation are reasonable or unreasonable. But appellee’s claim that 
Nebraska ground water is not an article of commerce goes too far: it 
would not only exempt Nebraska ground water regulation from burden-
on-commerce analysis, it would also curtail the affirmative power of 
Congress to implement its own policies concerning such regulation. If 
                                                           
 207 The third issue in the case, “whether Congress has granted the States permission to 
engage in ground water regulation that otherwise would be impermissible,” directly implicates 
the Benjamin principle. Id. at 943. 
 208 Id. at 949-50. 
 209 Id. at 952. 
 210 Id. 
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Congress chooses to legislate in this area under its commerce power, its 
regulation need not be more limited in Nebraska than in Texas and States 
with similar property laws. Ground water overdraft is a national problem 
and Congress has the power to deal with it on that scale.211  
In other words, the Ogallala aquifer is not located only in Nebraska, nor is water 
shortage limited to that state’s borders. Ground water overdraft of this shared aquifer 
creates spillover effects that states are responding to with discriminatory regulations. 
It is a collective problem, susceptible and desirous of collective solutions. Thus, 
ground water use falls within the power of Congress to regulate commerce among 
the several states. For these same reasons, state action that seeks to isolate the state 
from a common problem could lead to interstate rivalries and is therefore subject to 
being struck down under the negative Commerce Clause. In this respect, Sporhase 
illustrates a direct relationship between the two doctrines and its affirmative 
Commerce Clause analysis is precisely the type of analysis the Court should be 
doing post-Lopez.  
Aside from the reciprocity requirement, Nebraska’s regulation of the water 
resource was perfectly permissible because “a State that imposes severe withdrawal 
and use restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against interstate 
commerce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water out of the 
State.”212 The problem arose with the reciprocity requirement, which was not 
“narrowly tailored to the conservation and preservation rationale.”213 Nebraska made 
a final attempt to argue that Congress exhibited deference to state water law as 
evidenced by thirty-seven statutes and interstate compacts,214 and so the regulation 
should be upheld under the Benjamin principle. The Court rejected this argument, as 
there was insufficient evidence that “Congress’ intent and policy to sustain state 
legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause was expressly stated.”215 
In a somewhat ironic dissent, Justice Rehnquist joined by Justice O’Connor 
vehemently criticized the Sporhase majority for “gratuitously” reaching the 
application of both the negative and affirmative Commerce Clauses.216 To Justice 
Rehnquist, “[t]hat these two questions are quite distinct leaves no room for doubt.”217 
Rather,  
the authority of Congress under the power to regulate interstate commerce 
may reach a good deal further than the mere negative impact of the 
Commerce Clause in the absence of any action by Congress. Upon a 
showing that ground-water overdraft has a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce, for example, Congress arguably could regulate 
ground-water overdraft, even if ground water is not an ‘article of 
                                                           
 211 Id. at 952-54 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
 212 Id. at 955-56. 
 213 Id. at 957-58. 
 214 Id. at 958. 
 215 Id. at 960 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 216 Id. at 961 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 217 Id. 
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commerce’ itself. It is therefore wholly unnecessary to decide whether 
Congress could regulate ground-water overdraft in order to decide this 
case.218  
Justice Rehnquist went on to argue that the Nebraska statute should be upheld 
because water was not an “article of commerce” under state water law and was 
therefore beyond the reach of the negative Commerce Clause.219 Although Justice 
Rehnquist was clearly attempting to advance his states’ rights values, his dissent is 
ironic because his view of the affirmative commerce power is broad enough to 
displace the state regulation he was attempting to protect should Congress choose to 
do so. The majority would permit regulation of ground water overdraft because of 
collective action problems, thereby furthering the purpose of the Commerce Clause. 
The dissent would permit it if it substantially affected interstate commerce, which is 
not tied to any purpose related to the Commerce clause and is ultimately more 
damaging to state autonomy. 
D. A Unitary Commerce Clause? 
The Sporhase dissent is characteristic of a general view among some members of 
the Court and outside observers that is critical of a unitary Commerce Clause. Part of 
the hostility towards advocating a “unitary” Commerce Clause comes from a 
misunderstanding of what that might mean. Critics believe that advocating a unitary 
Commerce Clause means the same thing as advocating the now debunked dual 
federalism notion, which views state and congressional regulation of commerce as 
mutually exclusive and seeks to establish clear lines between what is intrastate or 
interstate commerce. 220 This view of dual federalism is undesirable because it relies 
solely on delineating formalistic categories. But this does not mean that the negative 
and affirmative Commerce Clauses cannot be unified under a functionalist inquiry 
driven by the Commerce Clause’s purpose. As Professors Cooter and Siegel note, 
“the main reason for separating powers is the relative advantages of the federal and 
state governments. Formal distinctions that are unrelated to relative advantages will 
fail to advance the general welfare when applied to federalism problems.”221 Thus, 
the Court can be true to its word when it says commerce means the same thing in 
both contexts, but it can only be internally consistent if it applies a functionalist 
approach. Certainly Congress’s power will still be far more expansive, but that is 
because it has the power to regulate on a nationwide scale and Article I, Section 8’s 
Necessary and Proper Clause will permit greater latitude to Congress in fulfilling the 
purpose of the Commerce Clause. That being the case, there is still no fundamental 
reason why the negative and affirmative Commerce Clauses both cannot be animated 
by functionalist inquiries that seek to further the ends of the Commerce Clause.  
                                                           
 218 Id. at 961-962 (citation omitted). 
 219 Id. at 963. 
 220 See Williams, Dual Federalism, supra note 170, at 1850. 
 221 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 30, 135; see also Balkin, supra note 30, at 22 (noting that 
while the contemporary Commerce Clause doctrine is often praised as being pragmatic and 
realistic, it is actually formalistic); Cushman, supra note 170, at 1149 (noting “the relentless 
pursuit of the logic of realism ha[s], in dialectical fashion, pointed the Court toward a new 
kind of formalism” in the affirmative Commerce Clause). 
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V. A NEW STANDARD OF REVIEW? 
In light of the foregoing analysis, the question then becomes how to translate the 
principles derived from the Court’s negative Commerce Clause doctrine into its 
affirmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence. As a threshold matter, in order for the 
Court to fulfill the promise of a government of limited powers, the Court must 
abandon formalistic categories in favor of functionalist inquiries. This argument is 
hardly novel as other scholars have advanced functionalist approaches for a number 
of years,222 but the negative Commerce Clause analysis here simply provides greater 
theoretical support and a doctrinal foundation for these views. This functionalist 
approach contends the Court’s affirmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence, like its 
negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence, should be driven by consideration of 
whether Congressional action in this realm advances the purpose of the Commerce 
Clause. The purpose of the Commerce Clause, as the Court makes clear in the 
negative Commerce Clause context, is interstate commercial harmony and economic 
union.  
The greatest threats to interstate commercial harmony are externalities or 
spillover effects of state behavior, and the greatest impediments to economic union 
are instances in which a uniform rule is needed or desired but is difficult to achieve 
because of coordination problems, which may be caused by races to the bottom or 
conflicting state regulations of national commerce. Congress, then, should only 
regulate to address externalities of activities within states or solve collective action 
problems that the states are singularly incompetent to address. Where the states face 
no such spillover effects or collective action problems, the Commerce Clause does 
not grant Congress any authority to act.  
This view of what Congress should regulate directly maps onto views of 
collective action federalism. For example, Professors Cooter and Siegel argue that 
power should be assigned “to the smallest unit of government that internalizes the 
effects of its exercise.”223 The relevant question for congressional legislation, then, is 
“whether there is a spillover of welfare and whether the spillover causes a collective 
action problem. The issue is not whether a crime [or other regulated activity] is 
‘economic’ in nature.”224 Professor Jack Balkin similarly argues that “federal 
problems are those that single states cannot unilaterally solve by themselves, because 
activity in one state has spillover effects in other states, or because a problem that 
affects multiple states creates collective action problems, so that some states may be 
                                                           
 222 See Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 
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unable or unwilling to act effectively in ways that promote the general welfare unless 
other states do so as well.”225  
Moreover, the benefits of this framework for the Commerce Clause are clear. By 
restricting congressional power to address collective action problems, we start with a 
presumption that the states can regulate all commercial activity and Congress may 
displace the states and regulate such activity only when it furthers the ends of the 
Commerce Clause. This approach responds to those, such as Professor Friedman, 
who lament the fact that constitutional law currently “lacks a coherent vision of 
when national authority or state authority should be exercised.”226 In fact, the 
functional theory advocated here encapsulates the four instances in which Professor 
Friedman argues it is appropriate to exercise national power: providing public goods, 
addressing externalities, preventing races to the bottom, and creating uniformity.227 
Because this doctrine begins with a default presumption in favor of the states and 
only allows Congress to displace the states when it furthers the ends of the 
Commerce Clause, it does more to protect state autonomy than the current 
framework. This will allow the states to experiment and enunciate local values, 
while similarly capturing the benefits provided by a centralized government. 
A. Application of Negative Commerce Clause Principles to Existing Case Law 
Applying the insights from the negative Commerce Clause to the prominent 
modern Commerce Clause cases of Lopez, Morrison, and Raich results in the same 
outcome as that reached by the Court, indicating that a functionalist inquiry is 
unlikely to greatly upset settled expectations. Beginning with Lopez, regulating 
possession of guns on school campuses does not produce externalities that the states 
are incompetent or poorly incentivized to address on their own. This is because “the 
absence of regulation of guns near schools in one state would not undercut the 
effectiveness of regulations prohibiting them in other states.”228 In fact, the states 
internalize directly the costs of guns in schools,229 and are also in a better position to 
formulate effective solutions that take into account local values and circumstances. 
In the terminology of Professors Cooter and Siegel, they are the smallest unit of 
government that internalizes the effects of its exercise.230 This explanation does not 
require an attempt to distinguish the truly local from the truly national as the Lopez 
majority attempted to do. Nor does it rely on an attempt to delineate activity that 
“substantially affects interstate commerce,” which is vulnerable to the attack that 
anything substantially affects interstate commerce if extrapolated at a high enough 
level. Instead, congressional regulation of guns in schools is not needed to secure the 
maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the states because one state’s 
decision in this realm will have very little effect on another.  
Similarly, the problem posed by gender-based violence in Morrison does not 
create spillover effects that are likely to undermine the policies of neighboring states, 
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nor does the issue lend itself to a “race to the bottom” in which the states would like 
to but are unable to address the issue because of cross-cutting pressures favoring no 
intervention. If one state decides to establish a private right of action for victims of 
gender-based violence, another state that has chosen not to establish such a private 
right will not have its policy undermined by its neighbor. Nor will it be the case that 
a state would want to establish such a right, but “race to the bottom” forces would 
prevent it from effectuating this policy preference. Like guns in schools, gender-
based violence produces costs that are internalized within the state. Moreover, a 
similar analysis would be called for regardless of whether the activity were 
traditionally a matter of family law, which was an additional justification offered in 
Morrison as to why this was beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause.231 Whether 
the regulation in question is traditionally a matter of family law or some other 
traditional state domain is irrelevant to the determination of whether it poses 
collective action problems requiring congressional solutions.  
In contrast, the regulation of marijuana at issue in Raich does create spillover 
effects that undermine the policy preferences of neighboring states, largely because 
marijuana is a fungible commodity. A state that prohibits marijuana use within its 
borders will find that policy undermined by a neighboring state’s decision to legalize 
marijuana; efforts to eradicate the drug within the state’s borders will be less 
effective when the drug can easily flow back in from a neighboring state. The 
scenario in Raich, though, reveals that the nature of a collective action problem is in 
the eye of the beholder. The state that has chosen to legalize marijuana will be 
thwarted simply because its sister states have taken the opposite view and are going 
to be able to impose their policy preferences on the legalizing state. This is a natural 
consequence of our federal system, and one that is addressed by the fact that all the 
states are represented in Congress. Similar to the reasoning in Wunnicke behind the 
clear statement rule under the Benjamin principle, the fact that the states collectively 
chose to address one collective action problem as opposed to another is a policy 
determination left to the Congress in which all states are represented. As long as 
Congress is addressing a collective action problem in some form, the fact that not all 
states will be able to effectuate their own policy preferences is part of the price of 
membership in the union. Thus, a collective action problem need not have consensus 
support. Other scholars have analyzed how collective action views of federalism 
would apply to environmental232 and labor regulation,233 as well as civil rights, 234 
and have similarly noted that a collective action approach is unlikely to upset settled 
expectations in these other areas.  
One final example directly anticipates the argument that we need a plenary 
commerce power to address the complexity of modern society. The discussion of 
Benjamin noted that there may be reasons, such as path dependency, why Congress 
may prefer to allow states to regulate an activity such as the market for interstate 
insurance. This example also reveals how an activity could evolve over time from 
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being beyond the reach of Congress to requiring congressional legislation. Two 
hundred years ago, state regulation of insurance companies likely imposed tolerable 
externalities on neighboring states given the size of insurance companies and the 
limited interconnectedness of insurance and financial markets.235 It may have been 
inappropriate for Congress to regulate insurance companies at that time.236 However, 
the financial collapse of 2008 revealed that states were no longer capable of 
adequately regulating interstate insurance companies. This lax oversight of global 
insurance companies was brought into stark relief with the collapse of AIG. 
Although Congress previously authorized this state of affairs, the enormous spillover 
effects caused by state regulation of the insurance industry makes it a prime 
candidate for collective action and thus congressional legislation. Individual states 
lack the resources and, potentially, the incentive to police global insurance 
companies and the subsequent lack of regulation imposes externalities on all states in 
the country when these insurance companies engage in risky financial transactions 
that expose the whole country to economic turmoil. Perhaps recognizing this, 
Congress has already moved in the direction of greater oversight to address this 
collective action problem with the creation of the Federal Insurance Office as part of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.237  
B. Articulating a Standard of Review 
Admittedly, putting the collective action insights from the negative Commerce 
Clause into a concise standard of review is easier said than done. As Sporhase and 
Justice Ginsburg’s partial dissent in National Federation indicate, the Court is 
clearly competent to analyze and recognize collective action problems in need of 
Congressional solution, but whether it can do so without incurring the same criticism 
it encountered under its Lochner-era decisions is unclear. For example, such 
assessment of facts and weighing of interests is likely to incur criticism that the 
Court is acting outside its judicial competence and directly undermining our 
democratic institutions by acting as a super legislature. Yet the Court is already 
doing something similar to this under Lopez by asking whether the regulated activity 
“substantially affects” interstate commerce, which in turn requires asking whether 
the activity is economic in nature or has a sufficiently close link to interstate 
commerce. If the Court is going to engage in such policy review it should at least 
apply a more principled justification for what it is doing. One solution may be to 
require a clear statement from Congress, similar to that required by the Benjamin 
principle, indicating that it considered the issue and decided to displace the states 
because of a collective action problem. Professors Cooter and Siegel advance a 
standard of “reasonable basis review” that would ask “whether Congress had a 
reasonable basis to believe that it was ameliorating a significant problem of 
collection action involving two or more states.”238 The Court would then uphold the 
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law if “reasonable people could disagree (1) about the existence of a collective 
action problem, (2) about the seriousness of the problem, and (3) about the efficacy 
of the congressional response.”239 Additionally, they would require Congress to 
provide a basis for its judgment to which courts would defer if plausible. Professors 
Cooter and Siegel believe this approach, while not perfect, may strike the 
appropriate balance by “‘cu[ing]’ the political branches to take seriously those 
federalism questions that are worth taking seriously, but it would not license federal 
courts to engage in Lochner-style invalidations of many federal laws and overrulings 
of precedent.”240 As far as suggested standards of review go, I am not sure we can do 
much better than this.  
C. Application to the Affordable Care Act 
Justice Ginsburg arguably applied just this standard of review to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)241 in her partial dissent in National 
Federation. Early in her opinion, Justice Ginsburg declares, “States cannot resolve 
the problems of the uninsured on their own.”242 Although she did not cite it for this 
point, the very opinion that overruled Paul v. Virginia’s holding that “the business of 
insurance is not commerce” provides support for the proposition that the regulation 
of insurance as a general matter poses collective action problems for the states: “The 
power granted Congress . . . is the power to legislate concerning transactions which, 
reaching across state boundaries, affect the people of more states than one; to govern 
affairs which the individual states, with their limited territorial jurisdictions, are not 
fully capable of governing.”243 That case, South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 
concerned the application of the Sherman Act’s prohibition on restraints of trade.244 
Given the interstate character and size of the insurance companies at issue, 
individual states were not fully capable of addressing the noncompetitive practices 
alleged, such as the fixing of noncompetitive premium rates for certain kinds of 
insurance.245 Although no one is necessarily alleging anti-trust violations in the 
present provision of healthcare in America, the market forces underlying the 
interstate medical insurance system—involving patients, doctors, hospitals, 
insurance providers, and pharmaceutical companies—are similar in that the 
individual states are singularly incompetent to extend maximum coverage to their 
respective populations at rates that will not be prohibitively expensive.246  
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 These market forces also explain the underlying two-part structure of the ACA. 
The first component involves prohibitions on certain underwriting practices of 
insurance companies, such as “denying coverage based on preexisting conditions, 
canceling insurance, discriminating based on medical history, and imposing lifetime 
benefit limits.”247 As Justice Ginsburg noted, no one state could impose these 
requirements alone without either losing insurance companies willing to insure its 
own citizens or imposing astronomical insurance rates on its own citizens.248 This is 
because an insurance company unable to limit its risk exposure with these 
underwriting practices will be forced to raise its rates on those remaining in its 
coverage pool, largely because existing state and federal law limits the ability of 
healthcare providers to deny treatment to those lacking insurance.249 Hospitals forced 
to treat these uninsured individuals pass these costs on to the insured and their 
insurance companies. In this respect, healthcare has been described as mandated 
access to a private good,250 similar to a public good that is non-excludable with its 
concomitant free rider problems. It is this feature of healthcare that led to the second 
part of the two-part structure at the heart of the ACA, or the so-called “individual 
mandate” or “minimum coverage provision.”251 In order to address the “free rider” 
problem and spread risk more evenly throughout the entire population, the ACA 
mandates that all individuals who lack health insurance, either because they do not 
qualify for government-based programs or receive private health insurance from 
their employers, purchase health insurance in the private market.252 Without the 
individual mandate, the changes to underwriting practices are unfeasible.253 But it is 
this second part that raised the most consternation, with critics latching on to the idea 
that the government is forcing individuals to purchase a product that they would not 
buy otherwise. 
There is little doubt that this two-part structure addresses a collective action 
problem. The only relevant question under a standard of review driven by the 
purpose of the Commerce Clause is whether this is a collective action problem 
among the states.254 Justice Ginsburg argued that “States that undertake health-care 
reforms on their own . . . risk placing themselves in a position of economic 
disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors. . . . Facing that risk, 
individual States are unlikely to take the initiative in addressing the problem of the 
uninsured, even though solving that problem is in all States’ best interests.”255 
Professor Siegel comprehensively analyzed the dynamics leading to this outcome, 
and notes there are two types of collective action problems posed by the current state 
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of healthcare in the country that might be addressed by the Act: a “race to the 
bottom” or interstate spillover effects.256 With respect to spillover effects, the 
argument is that  
an uninsured individual in State A may go to State B for medical care, 
either temporarily or permanently, because the publicly financed care 
options in State A are less available or less generous. In this situation, the 
uninsured individual in State A is free riding on insured individuals in 
State B, and State A is free riding on State B by not providing public 
benefits sufficient to prevent an exodus of its own residents to State B.257  
However, State B can solve this problem by denying the benefit to non-state 
residents and thus deprive them of what is essentially a positive externality. To the 
extent a state is successful in doing so it would solve any potential collective action 
problem, but the Court’s holding in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County258 
arguably limits the ability of states to require meaningful residency requirements.259 
As Justice Ginsburg noted, “[a]n influx of unhealthy individuals into a State with 
universal health care would result in increased spending on medical services. To 
cover the increased costs, a State would have to raise taxes, and private health-
insurance companies would have to increase premiums. Higher taxes and increased 
insurance costs would, in turn, encourage businesses and healthy individuals to leave 
the State.’”260 And there is anecdotal evidence of this type of spillover effect already 
occurring in that Washington, D.C., which provides more generous healthcare 
coverage for its own residents, has been confronting the problem of Maryland and 
Virginia residents crossing into the District to obtain treatment.261 Similar problems 
have arisen in Massachusetts.262  
Yet, even Professor Siegel acknowledges that “the apparent success of 
Massachusetts in achieving near universal coverage without causing insurers to leave 
[may] demonstrate that the interstate spillover effects are modest at best, such that 
states can ‘go it alone’ without incurring prohibitive costs.”263 In the six years since 
Massachusetts implemented its own two-part structure, coverage has increased, 
insurance companies have not left the state, and the overall cost to the state has been 
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reasonable. 264 At the same time, healthcare costs in Massachusetts are continuing to 
rise and unless the state is able to bring those costs down, its model program may be 
unsustainable.265 Ironically, then, while Massachusetts is the model for the 
nationwide approach embodied in the ACA, its independent success could provide 
evidence that there is no “race to the bottom” or interstate spillover effect requiring 
Congress’s attention. It should be stressed that the evidence is not clear one way or 
the other. And the fact that only Massachusetts, a relatively prosperous state with a 
low percentage of uninsureds to begin with, has tried such an ambitious approach 
may be the clearest sign that the states are in fact trapped in a race to the bottom, 
requiring “Congress’ intervention . . . to overcome this collective-action impasse,” as 
Justice Ginsburg contends.266 This mixed bag of evidence indicates that ultimately, 
even under a collective action theory, the Court will not be able to escape the 
criticism that it is engaging in policy review. For this reason, the Cooter-Siegel 
deferential standard of review provides a compromise that gives effect to the purpose 
of the Commerce Clause while maintaining the separation of competencies between 
our democratic legislatures and appointed courts. Applying their standard of review 
on these facts would uphold the law because “reasonable people could disagree (1) 
about the existence of a collective action problem, (2) about the seriousness of the 
problem, and (3) about the efficacy of the congressional response.”267  
VI. CONCLUSION 
United States v. Lopez rightly acknowledged that in order to give full effect to the 
values of federalism embedded in the Constitution and the related notion that the 
national government is one of limited powers, some limitation on the commerce 
power is needed.268 But without an understanding of why we have the Commerce 
Clause in the first place, it is difficult to articulate a limitation of the power, much 
less one that furthers the values of federalism. Justice Ginsburg deserves credit for 
attempting to rectify this problem of under-theorization by bringing a discussion of 
the Commerce Clause’s purpose back into the Court’s affirmative jurisprudence. 
Unfortunately, the Court’s own precedent in the affirmative context did not provide 
her much source material to buttress her argument regarding the Clause’s purpose. 
The Court’s negative Commerce Clause doctrine, though, provides an understanding 
of the purpose she advocated and one that derives itself from almost two centuries of 
doctrine. It provides a sound basis of doctrinal support to advocate collective action 
views of federalism. In sum, the Court has enforced the negative Commerce Clause 
to achieve the dual interests it attributes to the Commerce Clause of interstate 
commercial harmony and economic union. It takes a strict line with respect to 
interstate commercial harmony by imposing a virtually per se rule of invalidity to 
discriminatory actions, but recognizes states retain the ability to regulate commerce 
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under their police power and engages in balancing when a non-discriminatory state 
action nonetheless burdens interstate commerce and threatens economic union. This 
reveals that to further the goal of interstate commercial harmony, Congress should 
regulate to address externalities of state behavior. To further economic union, 
Congress may regulate to solve collective action problems where a rule of 
uniformity is needed due to the interstate nature of a given economic activity. At a 
minimum, the negative Commerce Clause reveals that the Court should and can 
avoid formalistic categories such as the commercial/non-commercial framework of 
Lopez, or the activity/inactivity divide in National Federation. Rather, to give full 
effect to the values of federalism and a government of limited powers, the Court 
should employ a functionalist inquiry that only permits Congress to regulate 
commerce among the several states when it furthers the ends of the Commerce 
Clause.  
The fractured opinions in National Federation leave interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause’s reach open to continued debate. Chief Justice Roberts did not 
engage Justice Ginsburg’s arguments relating to the purpose underlying the 
Commerce Clause; in fact, he too lacked much doctrinal support for his holding. 
And even if a future majority of the Court were convinced of the wisdom of 
maintaining a threshold activity requirement to the exercise of Congress’s commerce 
power, there is still no reason why the Court cannot use Justice Ginsburg’s opinion 
as an opening to re-anchor the Commerce Clause to an understanding of its purpose. 
The negative Commerce Clause provides a clear indication of that purpose, and 
drawing on the negative inference in the affirmative context will provide the 
additional benefit of bringing these two bodies of law back into alignment.  
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